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Abstract
The Jugular Vein of Empire: Imperial Attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to 1956
Matthew Church
August 2, 2004
This thesis is examines the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to
1956. It begins with the canal share purchase by the Disraeli Government and ends with
the Suez Crisis. Traditional scholarship views relations between the Britain and the Suez
Canal as disjointed and highlighted by sporadic significant events. This thesis aims to
evaluate the history of these relations. The thesis is divided into five chapters with the
imperial attachment to the canal is divided into three chronological periods. In each phase
of attachment there is at least one distinct policy shift and re-evaluation of the importance
of the Suez Canal. While canal importance fluctuated, the continued re-strengthening of
the attachment demonstrates a continuous attachment to the canal. These findings
disprove traditional view of Anglo-Suez relations being disjointed. Summarily, this thesis
proved the existence of a continuous imperial attachment to the Suez Canal from 1875 to
1956.
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Chapter I
The Constant Attachment: Britain and the Suez Canal

On April 25, 1859, Ferdinand de Lesseps struck the ceremonial first blow at what
would become the Suez Canal at the town later to be known as Port Said.1 Upon
completion, the canal stretched one hundred miles. It connected the Red Sea with the
Mediterranean and opened on November 17, 1869. The Suez Canal cut the travel time
between Europe and the Far East and served to invigorate the Indian trade even further;
however, an unintended problem with the canal arose. The canal belonged to Egypt, but
also belonged to mankind.2 Historian Hugh Schonfield believed the canal had two
owners: Egypt and the rest of the world. The universal use of the canal caused it to
become an international concern and gave impetus for European powers to involve
themselves in Egyptian affairs. The canal not only represented a great development in
trade and technology, but also generated a new point of disputation among the powers of
Europe. The party most interested in the canal was Britain, despite having opposed the
canal construction and taken steps to obstruct the completion of the project. To the
British, the canal was of dire importance as the gateway to India. The canal would earn
titles such as nodal point, jugular vein of empire, and Clapham junction, a one hundred
1

Hugh Schonfield, The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969 (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami
Press, 1969), 37.
2
Ibid., x.

1

mile waterway on which the survival of the British Empire rested and which was the
main fulcrum of continued British control over India. The British were intimately
associated with the canal from the inception of the project to the aftermath of the
nationalization of the canal in late 1956. The history of British involvement in the Suez
Canal from 1875 to 1956 demonstrates a multitude of attitudes towards the canal and a
constant British willingness to defend the canal as if it were part of the Home Islands. In
reference to the canal, the term British refers to the military and political leaders of
Britain. While the common populace of Britain possessed a certain affinity for the canal,
the officials of the British government formulated and affected policy towards the Suez
Canal.
The British involvement with the Suez Canal existed long before its construction.
The importance of Egypt was most vividly illustrated by the French invasion of Egypt in
1798. Prior to 1800, the British had expected any challenge to India and the Middle East
to come from the sea and concentrated their defense efforts on a strong navy to aid in the
protection of both India and the road to India. The situation changed when a French
force under Napoleon invaded and occupied Egypt in 1798. The French invasion forced
Britain to deal with the vulnerability of the crossroads of the world, from which her
Indian trade and Eastern Empire could be menaced. A foreign power controlling the
overland route to India could harass British trade in the Middle East, prevent British
supply ships from taking on food and supplies in the region, and presumably march on
the frontier of India. In 1800, the British took the momentous decision to send an

2

expeditionary force to aid the Ottomans in repelling the French and to evict them from
Egypt. According to historian Edward Ingram, this decision demonstrated the British
priority for colonial and imperial matters over those of the continent and showed a shift
in British policy.3 The French invasion not only demonstrated a veritable weakness in
the British defense of India, but also ushered in a British policy of regarding the Middle
East, particularly Egypt, as a vital barrier for the safeguard of the Indian Empire.
The granting of the canal concession in 1856 and the possibility of a French canal
controlling the route to India sent British politicians and officials into a panic. The
Egyptian Government granted the concession a year before the 1857 Revolt in India,
which was put down with much effort by the British and caused a revision of their
methods of rule in India.4 French control of the canal would result in quicker access to
India by French troops and the denial of passage to British troops through the canal. The
shares of the Canal Company were owned by private French investors, but their interests
were safeguarded by the French Government. In the event of a French invasion of India,
British reinforcements would be sent to India via the Cape Route, which was a slower
journey than through the canal. Also, British power partially derived from the strength of
the Indian Army and an attack on India would severely weaken the power of the empire.
The multitudinous threat of a French canal cannot be emphasized enough and the
opportunity to gain control of the canal was in the minds of British statesmen during this
3

Edward Ingram, The British Empire as a World Power (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 237-261.
For a description of the 1857 revolt see John McLeod, A History of India (London: Greenwood Press,
2002) and for a seminal study on post mutiny policy in India see Sarvelli Gopal, British Policy in India
1858-1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
4
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time. The Egyptian Government presented the British with an opportunity in 1875 to
purchase shares in the Suez Canal Company. The Suez Canal Company was the
administrative body of the canal and supervised the running of the canal.5 It obtained its
income through dues and tolls paid by ships passing through the canal. The canal was
run by a board of directors and out of a possible four hundred thousand shares, 207, 600
were allotted to French investors and 177, 642 to Egypt.6 The extravagant debts and
financial mishaps of Khedive Ismail of Egypt drove the country to bankruptcy and Ismail
searched for a way to regain solvency. The answer it seemed was to sell off the Egyptian
shares of the Suez Canal to the highest bidder. Egypt expected bidders to come from
France and generate a wholly French ownership of the canal. However, the government
of Disraeli intervened and, without parliamentary approval, purchased the canal shares on
November 25, 1875.7 The share purchase gave Britain 176,602 shares, close to half of
the total shares in the company.8 Disraeli viewed the canal as the “key to India,” as many
Englishmen did, and the purchase was a self professed triumph. According to Disraeli,
Queen Victoria termed the purchase a great event in modern politics and Disraeli
believed he had prevented the canal from becoming entirely French.9 Britain owned

5

John Marlowe, A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 (Hamden, CT.:
Archon Books, 1965), 61-71.
6
Schonfield, 35.
7
Disraeli to Lady Bradford 11-25-1875 and 11-26-75 in Marquis of Zetland ed., Letters of Disraeli to Lady
Chesterfield and Lady Bradford 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1929), 461-463.
8
Schonfield, 47.
9
Disraeli to Lady Bradford 11-25-1875 and 11-26-75 in Zetland, 461-463.

4

nearly half of the canal shares and found commonality with France in regard to the need
for the canal to stay open and the proper administration of Egypt.

*

*

*

*

*

Still necessary is a review of the relevant literature on the topic. There are several
works on the Suez Canal that provide a wealth of information and propose different
arguments on the importance of the canal. Charles Hallberg’s The Suez Canal: Its
History and Diplomatic Importance is a fine work that outlines the British attachment to
the canal up to the 1930s.10 The work purports not only the accepted thesis that as long
as India was under British control the canal would be indispensable to the British Empire,
but also argues that the British would take any measure possible to avoid other powers
gaining influence over the canal. Hallberg asserts rightly that in times of trouble the
canal itself would become a battleground as long as the British controlled India.
Additionally, Hugh Schonfield’s The Suez Canal in Peace and War 1869-1969 provides a
chronological history of the canal and also addresses the duality of the canal as belonging
to both Egypt and the world. Schonfield traces the history of the canal itself in parallel to
the British preoccupation with the canal and the diplomatic view of the canal in both the
twentieth century and in light of the Eastern Question. Schonfield argues that the canal
belonged to Egypt and the world. According to Schonfield, this dual ownership made the
canal an infringement on Egyptian sovereignty. Finally, D.A. Farnie’s East and West of
10

Charles Hallberg, The Suez Canal: Its History and Diplomatic Importance (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1931).

5

the Suez 1854-1956 is an exhaustive study of the canal and focuses on every conceivable
economic benefit of the canal to Britain.11 It also addresses the national response to the
purchase of the canal shares by Disraeli in 1875. Farnie argues the economic benefit of
the canal to Britain was the reason for the attachment.
The works of Hallberg, Schonfield, and Farnie are useful to the study of the Suez
Canal, but their arguments are incomplete. Hallberg was correct in stressing the military
importance of the canal and that in times of trouble the canal would become a battlefield.
He is incorrect in arguing the attachment to the canal was predicated on British control of
India. As this paper will show, the loss of India did little to lessen the imperial
attachment to the canal and new reasons were found to justify continued British control
of the canal. Hallberg’s argument suffers due to its publication date and the state of the
empire at the time. Farnie correctly argues the economic importance of the canal, but
fails to include a focus on non-economic factors. The security reasons and the
attachment generated through British military victories are omitted. Schonfield provides
an interesting argument about the canal’s effect on Egyptian sovereignty, but
miscategorizes the forces acting against Egypt. While Schonfield suggests it was the
world that owned the canal and worked against Egyptian sovereignty, only Britain
undertook such actions. With the exception of indirect French financial control in the
late 1870s, Britain was the only country to take direct action against Egypt for the sake of
the canal until 1956. These arguments merit a revision.
11

D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez: the Suez Canal in History 1854-1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press
1969).
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Historian Steven Morewood observed that studies of the British in the
Mediterranean have focused on either early British involvement in the region or the Suez
Crisis.12 Morewood aimed to remedy this situation by focusing on interwar defense
strategy in Egypt, but only added another field to the multitude of possible areas of focus
when looking at Britain and the Suez Canal. As Morewood observed, most studies tend
to care about three things: the share purchase, the 1882 invasion, and the Suez Crisis.
Recent studies of defense strategy have existed on their own from these prior three topics
and tend to be more focused on British lack of preparation for World War II. Additional
studies on the Mandate system have devolved into a recounting of the struggle between
nationalists and British imperial desire, never incorporating the parts into the whole.
Even histories of the canal such as those by Farnie, Hallberg, and Schonfield, tend to
provide diplomatic histories of the canal and noteworthy events, lacking a linkage or
systemic approach. The most common error is to assume the canal was only important
because of India. This idea is incorrect. Many events involving Britain and the Suez
Canal exist from differing sources, no attempt to link them into one coherent study has
been undertaken.
While the works of Farnie, Schonfield, and Hallberg deal solely with the canal,
other works dealing with particular events in British policy towards the Suez Canal were
used in this study. On the topic of the 1882 invasion, the most detailed commentary lies
in Robert Harrison’s dissertation Road to Suez: Gladstone and the Egyptian Crisis of
12

Steven Morewood, “Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire; the Suez Canal in British Defense Strategy
1919-1941,” in War & Society Vol. 10, No.1 (May 1992), 82.
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1882, which not only provides an excellent depiction of the events, but also disputes the
traditional impetus for invasion and notes that the Egyptian forts and coastal batteries
were no legitimate threat, but did provide a casus belli.13 Foreign policy commentaries on
the invasion also proved useful. The traditional account of the 1882 invasion and the
argument that one driving force was the embarrassing situation of England being a
minority shareholder in a French company can be found in Paul Knaplund’s Gladstone’s
Foreign Policy. A comparison of the imperial motives of Gladstone and Disraeli is a
centerpiece of C.C. Eldridge’s England’s Mission: the Imperial Idea in the Age of
Gladstone and Disraeli.14 Also included in this book is the contention that the Suez Canal
held up the empire, allowed the empire to function, and that Disraeli succeeded in gaining
the interest of Queen Victoria in the empire. Kenneth Bourne’s The Foreign Policy of
Victorian England 1830-1902 provides an interesting background to the year of the share
purchase and is Palmerston centric in its composition.15 However the work does depict
the shifting power of the British Empire in terms of eliminating Continental threats and
only having to deal with Russia during the time of Gladstone and Disraeli. Bourne
provides a solid treatment to the German concession in 1888 to build the Berlin to
Baghdad Railway, which constituted a grave threat to the Indian Empire if construction
was completed. The railway allowed for the possible transport of Ottoman and German

13

Robert Harrison, Road to Suez: Gladstone and the Egyptian Crisis of 1882 (Ph.D. diss., University of
Southern California, 1987).
14
C.C. Eldridge, England’s Mission: the Imperial Idea in the Age of Gladstone and Disraeli (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
15
Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).
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troops to Baghdad and the border of India. The rail provided the Ottoman Government a
chance to attack or subvert British influence in the Gulf Dependencies.
Additionally, two works dealing with the charges of collusion during the Suez
Crisis were particularly useful. A multitude of books on the Suez collusion exist with
Terrance Robertson’s Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy being the most
important.16 Robertson focuses on Lester Pearson and the dealings at the United Nations
over Suez, which ultimately resulted in the creation of the United Nations Expeditionary
Force, the first UN peacekeeping force. Robertson is also one of the first authors to
accuse the British and French of collusion with Israel in the crisis and believes the AngloFrench ultimatum was not as idealistic as Eden and Lloyd would have scholars believe.
Donald Neff’s Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes American into the Middle East
provides a divergent view of the crisis and depicts the Americans as bringing justice to
the Middle East and standing against the neo-colonial action of the British and French.17
However, this work glosses over the comments of Dulles about Nasser needing to be
made to disgorge the canal, which was taken as tacit approval according to Eden and
Lloyd.
This paper suggests that a clear British attachment to the Suez Canal existed from
1875 to 1956. This paper differs from others in that it will begin with the
acknowledgement that the Suez Canal was always important to Britain and when reasons

16

Terence Robertson, Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1965).
Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East (New York: Linden
Press, 1981).
17

9

for importance disappeared, such as the end of the Indian Empire, the British found new
reasons for its importance. The rationale for this replacement is that by the twentieth
century and especially after the World Wars, the Suez Canal had earned its place in the
mantle of empire and was for all practical purposes British. It was part of the empire and
had long been described as invaluable and accepted by the British as such. The
attachment came from two main areas: strategic/diplomatic importance and
romanticism/imperial thought. By focusing on important events in British history
involving the Suez Canal, the history of the imperial attachment will be demonstrated and
in the end, the canal will be shown to have always been important to the British Empire.
This paper aims to address and evaluate the imperial attachment to the Suez Canal
from 1875 to 1956 and to outline and evaluate the shifts in British policy in regard to the
canal. The approach encompasses a fusion of diplomatic history, British military history,
imperial thought, and traditional British imperial history. The date for the beginning of
this work centers around the purchase of the canal shares by Disraeli in 1875. The study
will be divided into three main periods: 1875 -1914, 1914-1945, and 1945-1956.
Analyzed in the years in questions are both the high point of the British Empire under
Queen Victoria and the Disraeli and Gladstone ministries, the perils of the empire during
the period of the World Wars, and the Suez crisis, which is widely held as the death knell
of empire. The rationale for the division is policy based. In the first phase from 1875 to
1914, the early British involvement will be addressed and will entail the share purchase,
Dual Control, and the intervention of 1882. The first phase also addresses the start of

10

British suzerainty over Egypt and the diplomatic history pertinent to early twentieth
century diplomacy and the Mediterranean question. The second phase addresses World
War I and World War II, but also extends to the interwar era to showcase not only the
shifting British policies towards European powers, but also the last great expansion of the
empire into the Middle East. The third phase begins with the election of the Attlee
government in 1945 and also depicts the postwar order, the beginnings of the Cold War,
the struggles of British definition in the Cold War, and the response of the empire to panArabism and decolonization. Imbedded in each phase is a perceivable policy shift in
regard to the canal, generally shifting from dire importance to expendability. The
completion of this study will not only show the consistent attachment to the canal, in
differing forms, but also demonstrate that contrary to general scholarship, the canal
represented more to the empire than just a gateway to India and was still worth fighting
for in 1956. The impetus for this study stems from the tragic story of Sir Anthony Eden
and why in 1956 he staked his reputation and British world power on confronting Nasser
over the canal nationalization. After all, the canal was rightfully Egyptian, the action was
legal, and with India independent, the necessity of the canal was no longer apparent. The
interesting aspect of the attachment to the canal was the canal was run by a private
company, in which the British Government were a minority shareholder, and was only
under direct British control during World War I. By the end of this work, the reasons for
this importance and place in imperial lore will become clear.

11

In terms of general histories, many were useful, but as with all historical works
primary documents are the building blocks of any study and no primary source has been
more useful than Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates.18 While many volumes of Hansard’s
were consulted in this work, the main focus is on the debates from 1875 to 1882. These
debates aid in understanding the formation of the imperial attachment. By the second
phase, a sense of imperial attachment to the canal and an elevation to the imperial mantle
existed, but the initial debates over the canal purchase and later intervention in Egypt are
most noteworthy. Additional documentary evidence was obtained through J.C.
Hurewitz’s Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record.19
Numerous other primary sources were used in the discussion of the first phase of
attachment. The Marquis of Zetland’s Letters of Disraeli to Lady Chesterfield and Lady
Bradford proved quite useful in tracing the day to day events of the Disraeli ministry and
the prime minister’s response to the Suez purchase. On the topic of Gladstone, the two
most useful sources were The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord
Granville 1876-1886 and The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Ministerial

18

The most useful volumes were the following: Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1876 Vo. 227 ( London:
Cornelius Books, 1876 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates
1877 Vol. 234 (London: Cornelius Books, 1877 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s
Parliamentary Debates 1877 Vol. 235 (London: Cornelius Books, 1877 and New York: Kraus Reprint
Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1878 Vol. 242 (London: Cornelius Books, 1878 and
New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates 1882 Vol. 269 (London:
Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates
1882 Vol. 270 (London: Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint Company, 1971), and
Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates Vol. 271 (London: Cornelius Books, 1882 and New York: Kraus Reprint
Company, 1971).
19
J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record 2 vols. (Princeton, N.J.:
Van Nostrund, 1956.
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Correspondence, which both yielded insight into the decision to invade Egypt in 1882
and the varying attempts made to forestall invasion by British forces.20 The latter is also
noteworthy for its inclusion of Gladstone’s admission that the canal was the only British
interest in Egypt.21 Also of value was a compilation of the Midlothian Speeches, which
showcased the anti-Turkish policy of Gladstone’s 1880 Campaign and the supposed
desire for the infusion of a more moral foreign policy.22 The best primary account of the
British administrative experience in Egypt is Lord Cromer’s Modern Egypt.23 For a
supplement to Cromer’s work and address of the day to day routine of British officials in
Egypt see Lord Edward Cecil’s The Leisure of an Egyptian Official. 24
There were many primary sources used in the analysis of the second phase of
attachment and deal with the British experience in World War I and World War II. No
discussion of World War I in the Middle East is complete without mention of the fame
seeking T.E. Lawrence. Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph and Revolt in the Desert
are both useful in their conveyance of Lawrence’s experience in the war; however, it is
necessary to balance these works out with more recent scholarship since Lawrence tends
to take credit for the entire victory in the theater.25 Herbert Henry Asquith’s The Genesis

20

H.C.G. Matthew The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes and Ministerial Correspondence Volume
X January 1881 to June 1883 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Agatha Ramm ed., Political
Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876-1886, Volume 1 1870-1882 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1963).
21
Gladstone to Lord Ripon 9-6-1882 in Matthew, 327.
22
William Gladstone, Midlothian Speeches 1879 (New York: Humanities Press, 1971).
23
Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916).
24
Lord Edward Cecil, The Leisure of an Egyptian Official (London: Hodder and Staughton, 1921).
25
T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Doran, & Co.,
inc., 1936) and T.E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desert (New York: George H.Doran Company, 1927).
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of War contains a summary of the events leading up to World War I as well as the text of
the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907.26 The
particularly useful source on World War II was Winston Churchill’s The Second World
War, in particular Finest Hour and Hinge of Fate.27 No primary source on World War II
in North Africa is greater than Viscount Montgomery’s The Memoirs of Field Marshall
the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein KG, which allows the battle and events leading up
to and after the battle to be described by the hero of Alamein.28
The final phase of attachment benefited from a multitude of primary sources. The
most useful was Anthony Eden’s Full Circle: the Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 29 More
than any other man, Eden was involved in and blamed for the disaster at Suez and
oversaw what many believe to be the death knell of the British Empire. In his memoirs,
Eden attempts to justify his actions during the Suez Crisis and portray them as successful.
A different viewpoint is provided by Randolph Churchill’s The Rise and Fall of Sir
Anthony Eden which amounts to a harangue against Eden’s handling of the Suez Crisis
and his entire career.30 The biographies of Harold Macmillan provided an invaluable
assistance and most notably Tides of Fortune 1945-55 and Riding the Storm 1956-59,
which depict Macmillan’s role in the Suez Crisis and response to the economic crisis that
26

Herbert Henry Asquith, The Genesis of War (London: Cassell & Company Ltd., 1923).
Winston Churchill, The Second World War Volume 2 Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1949) and Winston Churchill The Second World War Volume 4 the Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1950).
28
Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshall, the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, KG
(New York: the World Publishing Company, 1958).
29
Anthony Eden, Full Circle: the Memoirs of Anthony Eden (London: Cassel & Co. Ltd., 1960).
30
Randolph Churchill, The Rise and Fall of Sir Anthony Eden (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1959).
27
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befell Britain during the time of the Suez debacle.31 Additionally, the latter volume gives
details of Macmillan’s own Government and the process of decolonization. Evelyn
Shuckburgh’s Descent to Suez: Foreign Office Diaries 1951- 1956 provides a day by day
account of the pre-nationalization dealings of Britain in the Middle East as well as the
memoirs of Eden’s former secretary and Foreign Office Under Secretary dealing with
Middle Eastern Affairs.32 Shuckburgh was quite close to Eden, in an important
diplomatic position during the Suez Crisis, and provides an invaluable work with the
publication of his diary. Selwyn Lloyd’s Suez 1956: A Personal Account includes the
memoirs of Eden’s Foreign Secretary and the man, along with Eden, given much of the
blame for the failure of the Suez expedition.33 Edward Heath’s The Course of My Life:
My Autobiography provides a first hand account of the Suez Conspiracy and the
Parliamentary reaction to the collusion.34 Robert Murphy’s A Diplomat Among Warriors
and Chester Cooper’s The Lion’s Last Roar provide the American perspective on the
crisis and the British decision to intervene.35 Mohamed Heikal’s Cutting the Lion’s Tail:
Suez Through Egyptian Eyes provides the account of one of Nasser’s closest confidantes

31

Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969) and Harold
Macmillan, Riding the Storm 1956-1959 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971).
32
Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez: Foreign Office Diaries 1951-56: From Churchill’s Last
Government to the Suez Crisis Under His Hand picked Successor Anthony Eden (New York: W.W. Norton
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and a glimpse into both the mind of Nasser and the Egyptian view of the event.36 The
most useful account on events in Jordan during this time is John Bagot Glubb’s A Soldier
with the Arabs which not only demonstrates the importance of the Arab Legion and
Britain to Transjordan, but also provides a description of Glubb’s dismissal, which served
to generate Eden’s hatred of Nasser.37
It would be impossible to master every detail of British imperial history and thus
certain general texts have been used to supplement the non-Suez related imperial history.
While primary sources form the basis of this study, numerous secondary sources were
also consulted. Lawrence James’ Rise and Fall of the British Empire provided a solid
overview of the world of the British Empire and also in a condensed version that allowed
for easy digestion as did Bernard Porter’s The Lion’s Share: a Short History of British
Imperialism 1850-1970.38 Also, Robert Robinson and John Gallagher’s Africa and the
Victorians: the Official Mind of Imperialism yielded not only an excellent commentary
on British involvement in Egypt and the events at Fashoda, but also provided a
description of both the moral and economic theories of imperialism.39 Ornamentalism by
David Cannadine, while not a general history, gave a most invaluable contribution to this
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work through its theory.40 Cannadine holds that the attachment to the empire was
generated by imposition of the British class system and the creation of parallel social
systems, which yielded particular attachment to the colonies, dominions, and mandates.
Furthering this theory is the work of A.P. Thornton in The Imperial Idea and its Enemies
and its seminal contribution to scholarship on British Imperial thought.41 The most useful
aspect of this work was Thornton’s assertion that the Middle East was the last place that
the British could feel imperial and provides a rationale for the British reluctance to
withdraw from the region.
With a topic such as this, there is also a need to understand Indian history and pre
1875 Anglo-Egyptian relations and British Foreign Policy.42 In terms of pre-canal
history and British involvement in Egypt, the best available source is Edward Ingram’s
The British Empire as a World Power, which addresses both the repercussions of the
invasion of 1800, the steps and policy leading to the invasion, and new view of Egypt as
the key to India, but also develops a conclusion of an empire over Europe approach to
policy and a brief section on the expansion of the Indian empire under Wellesley.43
Additionally, Britain in the Middle East by Sarah Searight provides traveler’s accounts of
Englishmen in the Middle East. Sir Reader Bullard’s Britain and the Middle East from
the Earliest Times to 1956 furthers Searight’s work in tracing early British contact with
40
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the Middle East, but surpasses Searight by its attention to detail and discussion of British
policy up until the Suez Crisis.44 Several general histories of Egypt and the Ottoman
Empire during this period were consulted.45 The best work on the topic is John
Marlowe’s A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations 1800-1956 which
combines the development of post Mameluke Egypt with an appraisal of the diplomatic
history of British-Egyptian relations.46
As has already been noted, the first phase was heavily reliant upon Hansard’s and
other primary sources, but also made use of some secondary sources. The phase also is
heavy on sources dealing with Gladstone and Disraeli. In reference to Disraeli, one must
always begin with Robert Blake’s Disraeli, by far the best biography ever written about
Disraeli and an exhaustive account of the life of the mercurial prime minister.47 Also,
Edgar Feuchtwanger’s Disraeli was a useful source, though more compacted than the
exhaustive work of Blake.48 For details on the 1882 invasion and the penultimate battle
of Tel –el Kebir in Egypt see Byron Farwell’s Queen Victoria’s Little Wars.49
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The second phase encompasses three main events: World War I, interwar
diplomacy, and World War II. For works discussing the Suez Canal in World War I see
the already mentioned works of Marlowe, Hallberg, and Schonfield. The naval race and
the deterioration of Anglo-German relations are expertly retold in Robert Massie’s
Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War.50 The work focuses
on the naval advancements in the pre-war era, but is also useful in its address of all
aspects of Anglo-German relations. In terms of general histories of World War I, John
Keegan’s The First World War was a useful source and provided a coherent summary of
the Mediterranean theater of World War I and addresses action in the Suez Canal area,
the Arab revolt, Gallipoli, and Salonika.51 B.H. Liddell Hart’s War in Outline 1914-1918
also proved very useful.52 Finally, the topic of coping with trench warfare and the actual
experience of World War I are described in the legendary The Great War and Modern
Memory by Paul Fussell.53 For a general work on the interwar diplomacy, European
Diplomacy between the Two Wars 1919-1939, edited by Hans Gatzke, is particularly
helpful, most notably the sections on the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, Hoare-Laval
Pact, and the new interpretation of the Munich crisis.54 Robert H Ferrell’s Peace in Their
Time was useful for its discussion of the Washington Naval Conference.55 Ian Nish’s
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Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period provided information on the termination
of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.56 For secondary information on the Second World War,
see John Keegan’s The Second World War. 57
In terms of the Middle East in World War I and the subsequent establishment of
the mandate system, there are several noteworthy works. The story of Allenby and his
role in the Middle East is expertly told in Brian Gardner’s Allenby of Arabia: Lawrence’s
General, which is based on the traveling lecture tour of the postwar era.58 Another
noteworthy achievement of the previously mentioned works of Lawrence was to generate
a further Romantic attachment to the region, which is also apparent in the works of
Rudyard Kipling, most notably Kim which portrayed the romantic land and happenings
beyond the Suez Canal.59 E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India, while not specifically
commenting upon the Middle East, does attach a certain romantic aura to the canal.60
Bruce Westrate provides an indispensable study of the Arab Bureau and the struggle
between London, Cairo, and Delhi for dominance in shaping the policy in the Middle
East in his The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East 1916-1920.61 The end
result of the lands seized from the Ottoman Empire and the struggle between the India
Office and Foreign Office is found in Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain, India, and the
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Arabs, 1914-1921, which outlines the intentions of the India Office to claim
Mesopotamia as part of their imperial sphere.62 The Sykes-Picot Agreement and the
ramifications of this agreement are detailed in David Fromkin’s A Peace to End All
Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East.63
Also, the establishment of the British protectorate over Egypt and the accompanying text
can be found in Hurewitz. Additional aid was rendered by Byron Farwell’s The Great
War in Africa which depicts the struggle for colonies in Africa during World War I,
which served to tie down British troops in the pursuit of Lettow-Voorbeck.64
The interwar period is best exemplified by the gravitation between two topics:
British Foreign and Defense Policy and the British Empire in the Middle East. Interwar
policy in Egypt can be best found by consulting the works of Marlowe and any of the
general histories on the Suez Canal, most notably Schonfield. The most important
possessions were Egypt, Iraq, and Transjordan. These lands were under direct British
control for a period of time and after their independence were dominated by Britain,
earning the title informal empire. The quintessential work on this portion of British
Imperial history is Elizabeth Monroe’s Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 19141971.65 Daniel Silverfarb’s Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East: A Case Study
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of Iraq 1929-1941 provides a glimpse of the strategic importance of Iraq and the process
of Iraqi independence through the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, in addition to the Iraqi
insurgency/ attack on the Royal Air Force (RAF) base at Habbayynia.66 The best work on
British administered Iraq is Peter Sluglett’s Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 which provides a
detailed study of the creation of the state of Iraq and the numerous issues dealt with by
the British.67 In terms of Transjordan, Mary Wilson’s King Abdullah, Britain, and the
Making of Jordan provides a useful survey of the state building process and happenings
in Transjordan after the First World War.68 Palestine is an overwhelming topic and it is
not the point of this paper to enter into the quagmire that is Palestinian history. Several
histories of Israel, Palestine, and the Palestine Mandate were consulted for this thesis.69
The interwar period is of vital importance for the imperial attachment to the Suez
Canal, particularly in the multitude of shifts in importance of the canal in British policy.
Two areas of research in terms of this topic exist dealing with the Mediterranean strategy
of the British Empire during the interwar period and the military policy of the British
Empire in the post-war era. In terms of British military policy, the decline and neglect of
66
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the army is described in Brian Bond’s British Military Policy Between the Two World
Wars.70 The work describes the disdain for militarism in the postwar era in Britain and
the implementation of the Cardwell system and the Ten Year Rule by the British military,
which showcases not only the embracing of the spirit of Locarno and Kellogg-Briand
Pact, but also shows the apathy described by Fussell. The Great Powers in the Middle
East 1919-1939 demonstrates the waning paramountcy of Britain in the Middle East after
World War I and the gradual intrusion and competition of Italy and Germany in the
region, in addition to discussing the initial American forays into the region.71 The Suez
Canal underwent a diminution in importance in the interwar era and this is best illustrated
by Lawrence Pratt’s East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis 19361939 and Steven Morewood’s “Protecting the Jugular Vein of Empire: The Suez Canal in
British Defense Strategy 1919-1941.”72 Both works address the Mediterranean crisis and
the British decision to focus on a Far Eastern Strategy based out of Singapore in addition
to holding the Mediterranean. Also, Pratt discusses the Abyssinian crisis in depth and the
sense of British weakness where they felt unable to compete with the Italians in war.
Morewood and Pratt both convey the difficulty facing Britain and the possibility of a
three front war, and the gradual shift back to a “Mediterranean First” strategy. These
issues are furthered by Martin Kolinsky’s Britain’s War in the Middle East: Strategy and
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Diplomacy 1936-1942 which discusses the origination of the doctrine of self-sufficiency
for Egyptian defense and the drastic policy shift between the 1937 Imperial Conference
favoring a Far Eastern defense strategy and the 1939 St. James Conference focusing on
Mediterranean defense.73
The description of World War II in the Middle East draws from the work of
Keegan on the topic and is bolstered by Martins Gilbert’s definitive biography Winston
Churchill, in particular volumes six and seven Finest Hour and The Road to Victory.74
Another useful work is Roy Jenkins Churchill: A Biography.75 The imperative victory at
El Alamein is expertly detailed in John Bierman and Colin Smith’s The Battle of
Alamein: Turning Point of the War which provides every conceivable detail of the battle
and the North African campaign.76 The failure of the Singapore strategy and the doomed
naval demonstration is described in Christopher Bell’s “The Singapore Strategy and the
Deterrence of Japan: Winston Churchill, the Admiralty, and the Dispatch of Force Z.”77
The failure of an Atlantic Alliance cooperative strategy in the Far East is described in
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Nicholas Clifford’s “Britain, America, and the Far East 1937-1940: a Failure in
Cooperation.”78
The third phase from 1945 to 1956 deals with three main topics: decolonization,
Britain in the Cold War, and the Suez Crisis. The most useful source is William Roger
Louis’ The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United
States, and Postwar Imperialism.79 This superb work highlights the challenges facing
Britain in the postwar era from within the Middle East and the need to re-define the role
of the empire in the new world order. The work also provides an excellent survey of the
policy of the Attlee Government towards the Middle East and their dealing with the
Palestine issue and the rise of Egyptian Nationalism. Further useful works on the British
Empire in the Middle East and decolonization in general are D. George Boyce’s
Decolonization and the British Empire 1775-1997 and John Darwin’s Britain and
Decolonization: the Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World.80 The ultimate demise of
the British Empire and the withdrawal from Aden, Sudan, and the Persian Gulf is
described in Glen Balfour-Paul’s The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s
Relinquishment of Power in her last Three Dependencies.81 The struggle to find a
postwar role and define her world power status was a constant worry for Britain in the
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postwar world. There was gravitation between establishing itself as a superpower on par
with the United State and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or to be powerful through
the Atlantic Alliance. This dilemma had some bearing in the decision to stay in the
Middle East and to stand guard against any Soviet incursion. This attitude and struggle
for definition are described in the aforementioned Louis work, Glubb’s Britain and the
Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years 1908-1958, Ingram’s British Empire as a World Power,
and C.J. Bartlett’s British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century.82 A useful work on
the Attlee Government’s foreign policy is Kenneth Morgan’s Labour in Power 19451951.83
There are several secondary sources on the leaders and events of the Suez Crisis.
A supplement to Eden’s own biography is Robert Rhodes James’ Anthony Eden: A
Biography, which is a thorough account of the life of Eden; Eden’s own work only covers
his career in the second Churchill Government, his Ministry, and the Suez Crisis.84 Peter
Hahn’s The U.S., Great Britain and Egypt 1945-56: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early
Cold War describes the Suez Crisis in terms of the Cold War and the British action as
driving the Egyptians into the arms of the USSR, thus scuttling American efforts to
prevent a Soviet incursion into the Middle East.85 Suez 1956: the Crisis and Its
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Consequences edited by William Roger Louis and Roger Owen provides a beneficial set
of articles analyzing the crisis from every aspect and arguing that economics ultimately
doomed the British to failure.86 Leon Epstein’s British Politics During the Suez Crisis is
intended as a work of political science and ultimately derides the British system of
government and the inevitable disappearance of a two party British political system.87
However, the work is indispensable for its use of Suez as a case study and provision of
newspaper polls over the crisis. Epstein also suggests that the role of the Suez as a focal
point for British victories in the Middle East during both World Wars made it impossible
to dispense with the canal and describes the Suez Group of the Conservative Party which
seized on this issue as recourse for their desire for an old empire. The references to Suez
as semblant to Munich are to be found in Macmillan, Eden, and Lloyd. A personal
reflection on the Suez Crisis and its discussion in a family setting is described in
Cannadine. A very interesting article, Martin Francis’ “Tears, Tantrums, and Bared
Teeth: the Emotional Economy of Three Prime Ministers, 1951-1963,” suggests the
emphasis of stoic calm and lack of emotion as a public persona as undertaken by
Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan.88 This need to “hold it in” resorted in the breakdowns
and outbursts of Eden during the Suez Crisis. The issue of the media and newspaper
coverage of the Suez Crisis is addressed in the following two articles: Ralph Negrin’s
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“The Press and the Suez Crisis” and Guillaume Parmentier’s “The British Press in the
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Chapter II
Disraeli’s Coup and Gladstone’s Reluctant Intervention: Imperial Attachment to
the Canal 1875-1914

In 1875 Queen Victoria termed the Suez Canal share purchase a great event in
modern politics and the purchase itself was a triumph for Disraeli.1 The canal formed a
vital component of British policy and cemented the ultimate association of Britain with
Egypt. The rationale for this purchase predated the canal itself and two main events
shaped this relationship: the French invasion of 1800 and the Great Revolt of 1857. The
French invasion caused great fear in Great Britain. This invasion demonstrated that Egypt
represented an Achilles’ heel of the British Empire and threatened India. The Great
Revolt showed the tenuous nature of the British hold on India under the East India
Company and the need to secure the crown jewel of the empire. While the bulk of this
section focuses on British policy and its attachment towards the canal from 1875 to 1914,
the two pre-canal events are discussed in detail. Upon completion of this overview, the
main events of British policy towards the canal in the first phase of attachment will be
explored: the share purchase, dual control, the 1882 invasion, the Baghdadbahn, and the
pre World War I diplomatic state of affairs in the Mediterranean world.
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In 1798, the importance of Egypt to the British became evident due to the French
invasion of Egypt. France invaded Egypt as a way to crush England, rob her of
commerce, and cripple the empire.2 Napoleon remarked, “the time is not far distant when
we shall feel that in order to really destroy England, it is necessary for us to possess
Egypt.”3 After it became known that British troops would be required to subdue the
French force in Egypt, Britain dispatched her troops to Egypt. This action demonstrated
that when faced with the preservation of Indian security or Continental influence, the
British Government opted for defense of India. After the eventual expulsion of the French
force in 1802, historian Edward Ingram believes the British maintained their presence at
Malta not only to show their desire to stay in the region, but also to separate Europe from
the empire as much as possible.4 By maintaining the base at Malta, the British hoped to
control the routes to the empire and prevent European matters from resulting in attacks on
her imperial possessions overseas. The French invasion demonstrated that Egypt could be
a matter of consequence to European affairs.5 At this point, the Suez land bridge and the
preservation of communications with India became the most important element in British
strategic planning in Asia, long before the canal was even built. 6 In the 1830s, the British
used steamships and a regular steam and land route between Suez and Alexandria to
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improve communications with India.7 The new Suez route shortened the passage from
England to India to forty days, compared with five months round the Cape.8 Britain did
not want other European states to control this vital route. The French invasion provided
the impetus for Britain to begin entrenchment in the Eastern Mediterranean and led Tsar
Nicholas I to remark to the French Ambassador to the Russian Empire that:
The English have their eyes on Egypt. The country is necessary to them on
account of the new line of communication they seek to open with India.
They are establishing themselves in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.9

In the mid nineteenth century, the British became locked in a territorial rivalry with the
Russians over interests in Central Asia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Far East.10 Britain
decided upon a forward defense strategy for the Middle East and wanted to use trade and
sea power to secure defense goals in the region and to use the Ottoman Empire as a
buffer against both Russia and France.11 Britain also expected any challenge to their
influence in the Middle East to come from sea and concentrated on a naval defense
strategy.12 While the invasion led to an interest in the region for the safety of India,
events in India led to the region becoming of utter importance.
The British intervened in Egypt and remained at Malta to guard India from her
European rivals. But events in India in 1857 further necessitated the British attachment to
7
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Egypt and the later canal. The Great Revolt presented the gravest challenge to British
control of India and resulted in the direct imposition of crown control. The popular view
considers the revolt to have arisen out of the rumor that cartridges issued to Indian troops
were greased with animal fat, a practice repugnant to the Muslim and Hindu soldiers of
the Indian army. In actuality, taxes, denial of Foreign Service positions, religious reasons,
future opportunities, and a desire to reclaim the conquests of the East India Company
sparked the mutiny.13 The revolt began in late May 1857 and the mutineers captured
Delhi and reinstalled the Mughal dynasty as rulers of India.14 The revolt spread. Sepoys
turned on their officers. Rebels besieged British forces and civilians in the cities of Agra,
Cawnpore, and Lucknow. British reinforcements as well as reinforcements from
garrisons throughout the eastern empire arrived by the end of July.15 By 1858 the British
crushed the revolt, abolished the Mughal dynasty, and instituted direct crown control.16
Britain needed India for troops and India also supplied raw materials, foodstuffs, and
manufactured goods to the Home Islands, in addition to being a source of money and a
market.17 India made Britain a world power and the Great Revolt demonstrated the
dangers that could arise in India.
Prior to the Suez Canal construction, the British concluded that Egypt provided
the key to the gateway to India. The prospect of an enemy controlling the Egyptian land
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route constituted a viable threat to India. Additionally, the Great Revolt proved to Britain
that it was necessary to have a quick route to India for the sake of dispatching
reinforcements in times of trouble. When the canal was completed in 1869, the
immediate beneficiary was Britain, who constituted the majority of the shipping through
the canal. The British had already exhibited a willingness to sacrifice Continental
influence for imperial safety and the canal proved a vital conduit for trade to her eastern
empire. Once the canal became vital for trade to India, it became vital for Britain to
control the canal.18 The French invasion and the Great Revolt demonstrated to France
what Britain would do to protect India. The opening of the canal would further test the
British commitment to Indian defense.
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the resulting British trade through the
canal laid the foundation for the imperial attachment to the canal. The British had
strategic and commercial interests in the canal. The idea of a canal was initially regarded
as a French military weapon in Britain and events on the Continent were not going well
for the empire.19 Imperial pride underwent a renewal with the election of Benjamin
Disraeli as Prime Minister in 1874. He was widely regarded as the “defender of empire”
and concerned with ships, commerce, and colonies.20 Disraeli purchased the canal shares,
sent Indian troops to Malta to sway the Russians on the Treaty of San Stefano, and took
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other actions for the sake of defending the sea lanes and India. 21 The interesting decision
was the canal share purchase in 1875 since a Colonial Office official had referred to the
Cape Route as the center of the empire in 1871.22 While an obvious reason was the
security of India, trade was also a vital concern. By the end of his Ministry, Disraeli had
laid the foundation for the imperial attachment to the canal.
The opening of the canal and the years leading up to the purchase saw an
overwhelming British gain from the canal. In 1870, 486 ships carrying 436,609 net tons
passed through the canal of which 314 ships and 289,234 tons were British.23 In 1871, out
of 761,467 net tons of canal traffic 546,453 were British.24 In 1872 1,160,744 tons passed
through the canal; 854,037 British.25 In 1873, 1,367,768 tons went through the canal;
994,331 British.26 The following year 1,631,650 tons passed through the canal with
1,200,022 destined for or from Britain.27 The year of the share purchase Britain
accounted for 1,476,775 tons of the canal’s annual total of 2,009,984.28 In terms of
tonnage by flag, Britain accounted for the majority of the transit with France having a
tiny fraction of the total British shipping.29 Roughly 4/5 of Suez traffic was British and
the abundance of British trade passing through the canal was one of the main reasons for
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the share purchase. 30 The security of India was also a reason since the canal had nearly
halved the distance from India to England.31 In case of any disturbances similar to the
Great Revolt, the time for dispatching reinforcements was quicker and allowed a quicker
suppression of threats to the crown jewel of the empire. Finally and perhaps most
importantly, the value of the canal to Britain for both commerce and security had become
apparent in the early 1870s, but the canal was still controlled by a French dominated
company and Egypt by the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of London of 1841 provided for
a hereditary governorship (khedive) of Egypt which owed tribute to the Ottoman
Government.32While Egypt was semi-autonomous, the Khedive owed allegiance to the
Ottoman Sultan.33
The financial success of the Suez Canal was in doubt in 1871 and the Egyptian
investment in the canal appeared to be more of a burden than a benefit. The Egyptian
government had paid eight million pounds for fifteen percent of the net profits of the
canal.34 By 1871, the value of canal shares had dropped from Fr.500 to Fr.208 and the
Egyptian government was struggling financially.35 Khedive Ismail, who had lived
lavishly and spent lavishly during the Egyptian cotton boom, sought a buyer for his
shares of the canal. Ismail accumulated an average debt of seven million pounds per year
30

Blake, 581.
For example the Cape journey from Calcutta to Liverpool was 11,600 miles, but through Suez it was only
7,900 miles taken from Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East
(New York: Linden Press, 1981), 12-13.
32
William Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1994), 72-3.
33
Ibid.
34
Marlowe, 72.
35
Ibid., 73.
31

35

and became unable to make payments in 1875.36 He arranged a purchase option to be
offered to a French banker and for the Disraeli government to hear of this offer. 37
Disraeli heard of this offer and protested to the French Government that Britain would
object to the canal being wholly controlled by the French. The French Government was
reeling from the crushing defeat of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and allowed the option
to lapse. Thus roughly forty percent of the canal shares were up for sale and Disraeli
faced both a dilemma and an opportunity.
While the French had bypassed the option to gain the entire controlling interest in
the canal no guarantee existed that the opportunity might not be seized by another British
opponent. Additionally the value of the canal to trade and Indian security was well
known. Disraeli was determined that no country should control the Khedive’s shares and
believed that the canal was vital to the British Empire.38 After the French rejection of the
Egyptian offer, General Stanton the British Consul-General in Egypt informed the
Egyptian government that “Her Majesty’s Government are disposed to purchase the
shares if satisfactory terms can be arranged.”39 The Egyptians offered the shares to
Britain for the sum of four million pounds sterling and the offer was conveyed to the
Disraeli government on November 23, 1875, with an addendum that an answer was
required by November 25. On November 24, Lord Derby wired Stanton to close on the
offer. The government funded the purchase through a banking house founded by the
36
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Rothschilds and the purchase was approved while Parliament was not in session.40
Despite the sidestepping of Parliament, the Disraeli Government had acquired nearly half
of the canal shares.
Disraeli was exceptionally proud of himself and conveyed his self congratulation
in a letter to Lady Bradford:
After a fortnight of most uneasing labor and anxiety for between ourselves
and ourselves only I may be egotistical in this matter I have purchased for
England the Khedive of Egypt’s interest in the Suez Canal … had this not
been done the whole of the canal could have been French.41

Disraeli believed he had scored a tremendous victory for the empire by preventing the
French from controlling the canal. He furthered his self acclaim by conveying Queen
Victoria’s sentiments about the purchase. Noting the Queen was happy about the
purchase, she also told Disraeli the purchase was “a great event in modern politics.”42
The purchase had been a triumph for Disraeli. The purchase was a calculated step to
strengthen the empire and gave England a financial footing in Egypt thereby allowing her
to prevent any other country from obtaining exclusive control over the canal.43 The
purchase also led the press to view the canal as an indispensable highway of empire and
the British public cheered the purchase.44 The canal was a success for Disraeli even
though the purchase placed the British Government in the awkward position of being a
40
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minority shareholder in a French Company.45 In spite of this awkwardness, the canal
purchase was a triumph and as historian D.A. Farnie stated the issue, “Egypt became
almost an appendage to the necessary stepping stone to India and increased in value as a
dependent line of empire.46 The Cheltenham Free Press conveyed the importance of the
purchase by printing “Egypt is as necessary to England as Alsace Lorraine is to
Germany.”47 Disraeli had secured the vital link to the empire and the canal became a
foremost interest for the British. Yet Disraeli still had a hurdle to clear when Parliament
reconvened in February.
In February 1876 the House of Commons met to debate the share purchase. They
sanctioned the purchase, but not before the government was called to task for the
impetuous nature of the purchase without Commons consultation. Chancellor of the
Exchequer Northcote began the debate by providing a short history of the canal and the
benefit to England:
Now this great enterprise is one from which its first inception has attracted
the attention of this country … The canal has been made, has been opened,
and has been proven a great advantage to England.48

The Chancellor criticized the initial British disinvolvement from the canal and professed
that the benefit of the canal had deemed that this mighty enterprise should be controlled
by Britain. Despite the language of destiny, the root message was the shares were British
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and now so was the canal. He furthered this assertion by touting the benefit to India and
reading a statement from the India Office, in which the canal’s influence on British
relations with India was stated as two-fold:
Its influence on our relations with India is twofold- administration and
commercial. The administration has greatly benefited by the additional
facilities afforded for the transport of troops to and from India.49

The economic benefit of the canal was well known to the MPs in Commons and
Northcote stressed the imperial benefit and how the canal aided the administration and
protection of India. During the remainder of his speech, Northcote stated that “it is of
great importance that we should make the best provisions we can for securing
uninterrupted passage to India and our Eastern possessions.”50 His most telling statement
was,
It is destined to be an eternal possession of the human race; and I am sure
be a proud satisfaction to us if England fulfills her proper part in securing
and consolidating this great enterprise.51

Northcote cited four reasons for the purchase. The first was the obvious commercial
benefit stemming from the trade with India and the British holdings in Australasia. The
second was the security of the Indian Empire and benefit to holding the eastern
possessions of the empire. Both of these reasons were apparent to the members of
Commons. However, the other two reasons were more tenuous. The notion of destiny
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was unexpected and attempted to provide Britain with a non-political reason for
purchasing the shares. The last reason, the benefit to humanity, wedged the purchase of
the shares into the greater imperial mission, presumably to make the share purchase
tolerable to the Liberals. It would only make sense that the British Empire, being the
greatest power on earth, controlled the canal. While some flowery embellishment on
Northcote’s part existed, Disraeli was more practical:
I have always and do now recommend it to the country as a political
transaction and one which I believe is calculated to the strengthen the
empire … we are obtaining a great hold and interest in this important
position, because they believe that it secures to us a highway to our Indian
empire and other dependences.52

Disraeli provided the clearest rationale for the purchase, which was alluded to in his first
letter to Lady Bradford: empire. The calls of destiny and imperial mission served to
invest the canal with a high place in the imperial mind and to also give the purchase a
more moral/elevated reason for the purchase. Yet as soon as the canal became vital for
trade, it became vital for England to control it.53 The safety of India and the commercial
benefit of trade strengthened the empire. As Disraeli later demonstrated, the canal could
also be used to deploy the powerful Indian army into Europe if necessary, as was done at
Malta in 1878. Disraeli informed Lady Bradford of the threat of French control of the
canal, but the French could just as much close the canal as they could close the Straits of
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Gibraltar.54 If either were done, the French would be displaced by the powerful British
Navy and a landing force composed of both the British Army and Indian Army. In
addition, France was still reeling from her defeat in 1870 and was presumably unable to
risk such an endeavor. The belief soon arose that if there was no canal there would be no
India.55 Britain had become the canal’s biggest client by 1875 and the economic benefit
and benefit for controlling India were tied to the canal. The purchase also served to keep
a British voice in the management of the French dominated Suez Canal Company.56 Thus
Disraeli purchased the canal shares to strengthen the empire. Because of the purchase the
canal “was disassociated from Egypt in the English mind.”57
In terms of British political thought after the initial euphoria, the canal suffered a
relative diminution in stature in relation to other concerns. Disraeli noted in 1876 that
Constantinople was the key to India not Egypt and the Suez Canal.58 The Russo-Turkish
war of 1877 and the possible collapse of the Ottoman Empire created the possibility of
Russian domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This threat would persist until World
War I. If Russia controlled the Eastern Mediterranean and the Straits, the strategic value
of the canal would be lost and the eastern portion of the empire threatened. In addition,
the First Report of the Royal Commission on Colonial Defense noted:
the general result of these inquiries is that the security of the Suez route might
under certain contingencies become very precarious and the risk attendant on
54
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sending commercial ships through it so great as practically to preclude it use in
which case the long sea route would be the only one available.59

The Suez Canal was subject to local disturbances and was not surrounded by British
dominated territory as the Cape Route. Additionally, the British had no desire to get
involved in Egyptian affairs not related to the canal. Disraeli supported the Ottomans as a
way to buttress any Russian incursion into the Middle East and Egypt was under the
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. While the canal had been dissociated from Egypt in
the British mind, the next decade proved the opposite and interwove the canal interests of
Britain with the affairs of the tumultuous state of Egypt.
By 1882, events served to bring the British into Egyptian affairs and resulted in
their permanent presence on Egyptian soil. The Egyptian debt began to expand in 1876.
In that year her foreign loan debt rose to sixty eight million pounds, her internal loans
were fourteen and a half million pounds with a fourteen million pound floating debt.60
The debt arose from the Westernizing policies of Said and Ismail, which saw great
increases in the amount of rail and telegraph lines, canals, and cultivable land.61 Egypt
was going bankrupt and Europe was losing its investment in Egypt. While the
improvements were great, the Egyptian Government financed these projects through
European loans and the improvements were nullified by the expenditures. In particular,
Ismail attempted to improve the Egyptian infrastructure along European lines and was
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buoyed by the Egyptian cotton boom during the American Civil War. Unfortunately, the
end of the American Civil War ended the Egyptian cotton boom. The British share
purchase temporarily stemmed this trend, but in 1876 the growing insolvency of the
Egyptian government led European investors to dispatch the Cave Mission. Stephen
Cave, a British MP, was sent to Egypt in 1876 to investigate the financial situation. He
reported that Egypt was in a critical financial state.62 The situation became critical in
1878 and the French communicated to the British Foreign Minister Lord Derby that if the
two governments did not act together the matter was in danger of slipping out of their
control.63 The British and French governments appointed a joint Commission of Enquiry
and when Ismail formed an international cabinet with both the French and British
Commissioners as members of the cabinet, the action shocked the Commission. Ismail
took steps to remove the influence of the commissioners and felt their inclusion had
pacified the two European governments. The flouting of European advice and negligent
financial practices led the British and French to push for Ismail’s abdication. Despite
numerous calls for his willing abdication, Ismail determined to stay in power. The AngloFrench turned to the Ottoman Sultan who delivered a firman of deposition to Ismail on
June 25, 1879.64 The Ottoman Government appointed Ismail’s son Tawfiq khedive.
Britain pressured France to refrain from influencing Egyptian affairs after the deposition,
but the French maintained a presence and the Egyptians appointed controllers. These
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controllers, the British controller being Evelyn Baring later Lord Cromer, were to be
present at Cabinet meetings, demand information, give advice, and report to their
diplomatic representatives if the Egyptian Government failed to heed their advice.65 The
foreign investors acting through their governments later established an international
commission to evaluate the debt and it resulted in the Law of Liquidation calling for
roughly half of Egypt’s annual income of eighty million five hundred thousand pounds to
be earmarked for debt repayment.66 It became the duty of the controllers to administer
Egyptian finances to repay the debt and those two controllers became the bankers of the
Egyptian Government. The debts of Egypt had grown to such an extent to cause the
deposition of a Khedive in 1879 and British and French controllers installed to oversee
finances. The establishment of Dual Control not only demonstrated the power of the
British and French in regard to influencing Egypt, but it also laid the groundwork for the
1881-1882 Arabi revolt. Dual Control resembled Anglo-French suzerainty over Egypt
and led to resentment in the country over foreign dominance.67
While the British oversaw the finances of Egypt, the canal still held a paramount
interest. In 1877, Lord Derby had noted that “maintenance of uninterrupted
communication of the canal is in our view a British interest, one of the highest
importance, and one which we feel it is our duty not to neglect.”68 He later stated that the
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canal is “too grave and delicate a matter to be dealt with in an offhand manner.”69 Lord
Derby made these statements in response to the Russo-Turkish War and the threat to
Egypt, but Egypt was never threatened. The importance is that the canal, despite the
findings of the Colonial Defense Report and Disraeli’s Constantinople statement, was
still vitally important to Britain and her empire. British policy remained to control and
protect the canal and to avoid Egyptian entanglements, but the British had been drawn
into by the issue of Dual Control. Lord Cromer noted that the British policy in 1879 was
to not possess Egypt, but also to make sure no other country possessed it.70 The detriment
was that while the Suez Canal was still important and the Dual Control did not represent
actual control, the presence of foreign domination fomented subversion in Egypt and left
Britain with the choice of having to determine how much the canal was worth to its
empire.
The British maintained the policy of using the Ottoman Empire to buttress any
threat to the region, particularly by Russia, but this changed in 1880 with the election of
William Gladstone and the Liberals to Government.71 Gladstone gained office by seizing
upon the atrocities in Bulgaria as a cause of interest to the British electorate. Gladstone
was also anti-Turk and accused Disraeli of annexing Egypt.72 Gladstone was less likely to
favor the pro-Constantinople strategy of Disraeli and opposed more territorial acquisition
69
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believing a more moral foreign policy was the best pursuit of the British government. He
understood the canal as preserving the maintenance and security of empire and had
announced this view in 1859.73 However, the new government was less likely to further
British involvement in Egypt and desired avoiding any foreign entanglements such as
Disraeli had in Zululand and Afghanistan. This shift away from direct action and
militancy was passing and the Gladstone Government drew up contingency plans for an
invasion of Egypt in the wake of the French seizure of Tunis in 1881.74 The ready
acceptance of intervention by Gladstone’s Cabinet and Gladstone’s ultimate acceptance
show the importance of the canal to British defense policy. It appears that while
Gladstone would not indulge in the multitude of wars that Disraeli did, he would act to
defend vital interests and India. The Gladstone Ministry became involved in Egypt in
1882 and this involvement proved the extreme importance of the Suez Canal to Britain
since a pacifist government was willing to invade Egypt.
The troubles began with the forced abdication of Ismail and his replacement by
the more pliable Tawfiq.75 With Tawfiq’s accession the controllers exerted almost total
control over Egypt and the Law of Liquidation called for heavy taxes in Egypt, with half
the revenue going to the debt.76 What developed from an Egyptian point of view was the
Europeans had entered Egyptian politics, overthrew/forced out the legitimate Khedive,
and laid exorbitant taxes on the Egyptian population. Several bases of opposition arose,
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most importantly Constitutionalism and discord among the native Egyptian officers of the
army.77 Ismail had been able to quash this discontent, but the combination of Tawfiq,
who was not as strong as Ismail, and the proliferation of European influence exacerbated
the discontent and allowed it to manifest itself in the political realm. The Egyptian army
led the way. Ismail was in the process of raising the size of the army to sixty thousand,
but the Dual Control and Tawfiq insisted on a reduction to eighteen thousand and many
officers lost their careers.78 Ahmad Arabi emerged as the officers’ leader. He proved
instrumental in forcing Tawfiq to appoint one of their candidates Minister of War and
invited the Constitutionalists to form a government.79 The success of the officers against
Tawfiq demonstrated the disfavor afforded Tawfiq in Egypt and their actions revealed
him to be a puppet of the British and the French, essentially only the efforts of the British
and French governments allowed Tawfiq to remain in power. The officers’ movement
was profoundly anti-foreign targeting the old Turco-Circassian elite of the Egyptian army
and the Europeans. The Turco-Circassian elite dated to the times of Mohamad Ali and
controlled the army, preventing native Egyptians from attaining command positions.
These non-Egyptian elites were the first targets of the officer’s movement. The British
faced a possible insurgency and missed a chance for pacification when the French
Government of Gambetta forced the Gladstone Ministry to deny the Constitutionalist
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demand to vote on the budget and have input on Egyptian finances.80 By this rejection,
the Europeans drove the Constitutionalist Government of Egypt closer to the Army and
set the stage for further anti-foreign threats to Tawfiq’s authority.
The disturbance and challenge to Khedival authority began to worry the
Gladstone Government. In October 1881, Gladstone wrote to Lord Granville that the
Ottomans should handle the revolt. Under this plan, the only European involvement
would be the dispatch of a joint squadron.81 Despite his anti-Turkish policy and the
weakening of the Anglo-Ottoman alliance, Gladstone was not about to place Britain in a
situation necessitating the invasion of Egypt. A need to pacify the nationalists and restore
the authority of Tawfiq existed, but it was not the responsibility of Britain. On January 4,
1882, the Governments of Britain and France issued a Joint Note calling for Khedival
support, protection of the bondholders, all of which served to threaten the Nationalists.82
The Joint Note stressed the British and French support for Tawfiq and implied AngloFrench action or intervention if Tawfiq’s power was threatened. The threat of
intervention is conveyed in the following:
I have accordingly instructed you to declare to the Khedive that the
British and French Governments consider the maintenance of His
Highness on the throne, on the terms laid down in the Sultan’s firman and
officially recognized by the two Governments, as alone able to guarantee,
for the present and future, the good order and development of general
prosperity in Egypt in which France and Great Britain are equally
80
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interested. The two Governments, being closely associated in their resolve
to guard, by their united efforts, against all causes of complication,
internal or external, which might menace the order of things established in
Egypt, do not doubt the assurance publicly given of their fixed intention in
this respect will tend to avert the dangers to which the Government of the
Khedive might be exposed and which would certainly find England and
France united to oppose them.83

The Egyptians reacted swiftly and the Chamber of Notables began to fall in line with the
army and called for budget voting rights and an increase in the size of the army. The
Chamber of Notables sided with the army after the issue of the Joint Note and the threat
of foreign intervention in the governance of Egypt. On February 3, the Egyptian
Government resigned and a new government formed with Arabi as Minister of War.84
With Arabi in office and the government at his behest, the controllers could not control
the finances. The British and French Governments believed intervention was necessary to
protect the lives and property of their citizens in Egypt and sought Ottoman assistance.85
When the Ottomans decided against intervention, the British and French agreed to send
naval squadrons to Alexandria to protect their subjects and with the fleet’s arrival the
trouble escalated. 86 The presence of the fleet was intended to dissuade attacks on
European property.
Any chance for a peaceful settlement without British intervention had been lost
with the Joint Note and the arrival of the Anglo-French squadron. The new government
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that included Arabi became convinced that it was at risk, but it also had grown powerful
enough to nullify Khedival authority and eliminate the Dual Control. The British
squadron had orders to protect their subjects while the French instructed their fleet to
merely give moral support to the Khedive. 87 On June 10, anti-foreign riots broke out in
Alexandria killing fifty non-Egyptians. The crisis escalated beyond repair and at the
beginning of July the Egyptians constructed coastal fortifications and re-enforced the
garrison in Alexandria. Admiral Seymour received instructions from the Cabinet on July
5, 1882 that in the event of war a warning should be given and the Alexandria
fortifications destroyed.88 On July 6, Seymour warned British subjects to leave Egypt.
The stage was set for Seymour to issue an ultimatum to raze the fortifications. On July 5,
Gladstone instructed First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Northbrook to inform ships using
the canal what was occurring, thus attempting to preserve the safety and neutrality of the
canal.89 Admiral Seymour issued an ultimatum for the construction of coastal
fortifications to be halted on July 9 since the forts posed a danger to the British fleet.
When no reply came, he shelled Alexandria and destroyed the forts on July 11. The
shelling led to anarchy in Egypt and the British feared that the canal was threatened. On
July 14 Gladstone wrote to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, John Bright, that Arabi
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had brought the revolt upon himself.90 British forces occupied Alexandria on July 24 and
anarchy swept Egypt endangering the canal.
Gladstone and his cabinet approved the dispatch of the army to Egypt in a July 20
meeting and the intervention began.91 Gladstone was not intervening simply for the safety
of the bondholders, but to re-establish order and for the sake of imperial, Indian, and
maritime interests.92 The Indian army had been put on alert on June 20 for possible action
in the Suez area.93 Sir Garnet Wolseley commanded the military expedition that landed at
the canal. His force was comprised of 35,000 British troops and 6,000 Indian troops.94
The canal had been endangered by the revolt and the Khedive authorized the British
troops to seize Isthmian points that were necessary to safeguard the canal.95 The father of
the canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps feared British control of his creation and telegraphed
Arabi:
The English shall never enter the Canal, never. Make no attempt to
intercept my Canal. I am there. Not a single English soldier shall
disembark without being accompanied by a French soldier. I
answer for everything.96

Arabi responded by conveying his thanks to de Lesseps, but insisting that the defense of
Egypt required the destruction of the canal.97 By August the British controlled the canal
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and the British army destroyed the forces of Arabi on September 13 at the battle of Tel
el-Kebir.98 As a result, the British controlled Egypt and exiled Arabi to Sri Lanka. The
canal was preserved and Egypt stabilized, but what was the real cause for the
intervention?
Historian Charles Hallberg noted, “it was the canal that furnished the pretext for
intervening in Egypt and it was because of the canal that British troops remained.”99 The
supposed reasons of restoring Khedival authority and the Alexandria fortifications
presumably formed viable reasons for the intervention, but this was not the case. The
forts were a concocted threat at best and were little likely to do any serious damage to the
British fleet; in fact, British guns caused most of the damage to the city of Alexandria.100
Britain feared that the Arabi revolt could spark a similar revolt among their Muslim
subjects. Further, British troops were already heading towards the canal on June 20, prior
to the actual commencement of hostilities.101 The British could not gamble with security
of the routes to the east.102 The downfall of Khedival government was not a likely
impetus to force the anti-jingoistic Gladstone Government to intervene. The danger to the
canal allowed for Hartington, the Secretary of State for India, and similar minded
ministers to seize Cabinet control and protect what they deemed a vital interest.103 Britain
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professed to be acting in the interests of the Concert of Europe, but Britain was more
interested in her own security. Gladstone admitted the true reason for the intervention in a
letter to Lord Ripon, the Viceroy of India:
Apart from the canal we have no interest in Egypt itself which could
warrant intervention in my opinion. But the safety of the canal will not
coexist with illegality and military violence in Egypt and I doubt whether
Parliament and the nation would have sanctioned, as they almost
universally sanctioned, our proceedings except for the canal.104

The canal had assumed an importance far exceeding that accompanying the 1875 share
purchase. The fact that the Liberal Gladstone Government was willing to intervene in
Egypt for no reason other than the canal suggests the British imperial attachment to the
canal. Gladstone’s Government viewed the canal as the linchpin of the empire, the
stepping stone to India, and a great boon to trade. The fact that the canal was an interest
no government would gamble with demonstrated the extent to which the canal had
entered the imperial mind. The British viewed the canal as an imperial necessity. The
power of the empire came from India and the British ability to protect and defend India.
Britain had sent troops to Egypt and professed that they would only stay until order was
restored. They stayed until 1956. While the British Government touted their desire to
prevent French domination and Muslim insurgencies in other areas of the empire, the
truth was that the canal was the driving force behind Gladstone’s intervention in Egypt.
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His actions assured the safety of the canal. As the turn of the century approached, other
states pressed Britain on the issue of the canal.
The British occupation of Egypt created several unintended consequences despite
the profession that it was a temporary occupation. Cromer believed that the bankruptcy
and anarchy in Egypt left intervention the only answer.105 However, in a few years he
believed that reconstructed Egypt was a brighter jewel in the imperial crown than
India.106 The occupation yielded two consequences for the canal. First, Europe
recognized the British as guardians of the canal. The British believed themselves to be
exercising the Egyptian duty of guarding the canal for the simple fact that they were there
and the Khedive had invited them to intervene. Additionally, the British occupation led to
increased cries for, and a British desire to accommodate, the international status of the
canal. Other powers wanted guarantees for the free transit of the canal while at the same
time the British wanted to maintain the ability to intervene to protect the canal. Attempts
at settling the issue dragged, but in 1888 were settled at Constantinople.
On October 29, 1888, Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire signed the 1888 Constantinople
Convention.107 The most telling article was Article I which read:
The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open in time of war as
in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without
distinction of flag.
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Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to
interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace
The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of
blockade.108

Article IV reasserted the need for the canal to remain open in war even if the Ottomans
were one of the belligerents in the conflict, with this statement, the rightful guardians of
the canal could not even use the right of free passage to their advantage.109 However, a
loophole existed since Article IX called for the government of Egypt to act as charged
with the enforcement and execution of the Treaty.110 Article IX allowed for the British to
have a say in the defense of the canal because of their occupation and because of the
power they wielded in Egypt, Britain effectively governed Egypt. By 1890, Egypt was a
vital linchpin of British Eastern Mediterranean strategy.111 Also, the Ottoman Empire’s
continued decay necessitated the presence of Britain in Egypt to check Russian advances
and to preserve the path to India. However, other powers took aim at the British position
in Egypt.
In addition to the signing of the Constantinople Convention, the granting of the
Baghdad rail concession to Germany took place in 1888.112 The concession proposed the
opening of a railroad from Central Europe as far as Istanbul. 113 The line was seen as the
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first stage of a proposed rail line from Berlin to Baghdad. This concession not only
threatened the British hegemony in the Persian Gulf, but it also threatened to circumvent
the canal. The overland route potentially made the canal less important and allowed the
possible transit of a military force to the borders of Persia. The Germans had asserted that
one of the reasons the proposed rail was to aid the Ottomans in reclaiming control over
outlying areas and could substantially weaken British dominance of the East and offset
the canal.114 In Die Baghdadbahn, Paul Rohrbach formulated a clear way to harm the
British Empire:
England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe in
one place-Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean not only the end of her
dominion over the Suez Canal and her communications with India and the
Far East, but would probably also entail the loss of her possessions in
Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammadan power,
like Turkey, would also imperil England’s hold over her sixty million
Mohammadan subjects in India … The stronger Turkey becomes the
greater will be the danger for England, if in a German-English war,
Turkey should be on the side of Germany. 115

This followed an earlier surmisal of the importance of the Canal by Bismarck, who said
that the canal,
Is like the spinal cord which connects the backbone with the brain. The
Canal is the most important factor in shaping British Foreign Policy and
its control accounts in no small measure for England’s predominant
position in world affairs.116
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By the turn of the century, the Germans challenged British world power and Britain
found herself without any European allies. The Germans followed a three-fold path
entailing the construction of a strong navy, the building up of the Ottoman Empire, and
the use of rail to displace the British power emanating from the Suez Canal. These
matters came to a head in the 1906 Aqaba incident when a resurgent Ottoman Empire
occupied the Sinai Peninsula, an Ottoman holding. The British did not accept Turkish
troops so close to the canal, especially since the strengthened German-Ottoman alliance,
and sent warships to force the troops to retreat. In this instance, the British undermined
the authority of the Sultan in Egypt and had asserted their claim for true control of
Egypt.117
The Germans and Ottomans were not the only countries which made forays
against the British domination of the canal in the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. France and Russia were particularly upset with the British occupation
of Egypt and they felt that the British were supplanting the Ottoman Empire as suzerain
of Egypt.118 The Italians feared the French threatening Italy from North Africa and sought
alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance. Italy acquired Eritrea,
but was repulsed in Abyssinia in 1896.119 Despite the defeat in Abyssinia, the Italian
acquisition of Eritrea allowed for the Italians to impede Suez traffic if they so chose.
These developments placed a German allied Italy on the Red Sea Route to India and
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created a threat to the security of the sea lane to India. The French gained territory in the
Nile Valley at Fashoda, but were evicted. The forces of Kitchener evicted the French
force and France was left to ponder the British presence in the Nile Valley. 120 The
British had also expanded their territory into Sudan after the French invasion at Fashoda
and the later victory over the Mahdist forces at Omdurman in 1898.121 The victory at
Omdurman led to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium over Sudan and the British
dominance of the territory for the next half century. The expedition into Sudan and the
final territory annexation under the Egyptian flag allowed a buffer for Egypt, but the
Italians gained Tripoli and Cyrenaica in their war with the Ottomans in 1912. Sides took
shape for a coming conflict. Britain also curried disfavor by denying passage of the canal
to Spanish warships in 1898 and acted as a guardian of the canal instead a guardian of the
1888 Convention.122
The British viewed the coming conflict as a grave threat to their empire and began
to seek alliances. The first alliance was with Japan in 1902.123 By 1904 the Germans had
risen to equal or greater power than Britain. The Germans had already professed a
penchant for a Turkish alliance and the growing naval power of Germany along with the
Berlin to Baghdad rail generated fears in Britain. Additionally, the European powers were
120
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suspicious of Britain in light of her actions during the Spanish American War and the
possibility of the British closing the canal in times of war. However on April 8, 1904,
Britain signed an agreement with France that resulted in an alliance between two
countries. The genesis of the alliance stemmed from the mutual fears of Germany and
amounted to recognition by France of British control over Egypt and a British recognition
of French control over Morocco. While the alliance resulted in the end of British isolation
and the tacit recognition of her dominance in Egypt, it did require more of Britain in
respect to the canal. Article VI of the Agreement stated:
In order to ensure the free passage of the Suez Canal, His Britannic
Majesty’s Government declare that they adhere to the stipulations of the
Treaty of the 29th October 1888, and that they agree to their being put in
force. The Free Passage of the Canal being thus guaranteed the execution
of the last sentence of paragraph 1 as well as of paragraph 2 of Article
VIII of that Treaty will remain in abeyance. 124

Article VIII of the 1888 Convention called for the signatories of the Convention to
guarantee adherence to the convention and to prevent any developments which interfered
with canal navigation, in the event of interference of tribunal of signatory powers would
convene to remedy the situation.125 Essentially, as long as Britain maintained the free
navigation of the canal, no other European power could challenge her dominance by
tribunal, as provided by Article VIII of the Convention.126 The British had an ally but had
forfeited their rights to use the canal as a weapon and instead agreed to abide by the 1888
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Convention. The benefit aside from the alliance was that France recognized British gains
in Egypt and this advance was shortly afterwards recognized by Russia, Italy, and
Austria-Hungary.127 In 1907, the British gained further alliances with the signing of the
Anglo-Russian Convention settling disagreements in Central Asia, partitioning Persia
into zones of influence, and allowing for Britain to be allied with her former enemy.128
The Triple Entente, as it was termed, did not become a solid alliance until the outbreak of
war; but, for the time being, Britain was safe.129 In the years following the 1882 invasion,
Britain had suffered threats to her position in Egypt and in the region from France, Italy,
the Ottoman Empire, and Germany. The British had firm control over Egypt and by the
outbreak of the First World War the canal had even prevented the Ottomans from
occupying the adjoining Sinai Peninsula in the 1906 Aqaba incident. The commencement
of hostilities in 1914 put the canal in greater danger than it had ever been in 1882.
By the end of the first phase of attachment to the canal, Britain had demonstrated
several reasons for its obstinacy on the canal. The canal operated as a great benefit to
trade and a quick and viable route for Eastern trade. Additionally, the canal offered the
ability to safeguard the route to India and reinforce India itself and other imperial
interests. Finally, British policy makers viewed the canal as the linchpin of imperial
security. Politicians recognized the importance of the canal for defense and the security
of the empire. If the canal was lost or an effective alternative route possessed by an
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enemy power, the empire could be at risk and the link between the Home Islands and
India severed. The canal became linked with Gibraltar as one of the vital outposts
necessary for imperial defense. For all practical purposes, Britain had cemented its
relationship with the canal, a relationship that World War I would test.
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Chapter III
Fighting for the Canal: the Strategic Importance of the Canal in World War I and
II

By 1914, the Suez Canal had become part of the British Empire. The British had
invaded Egypt for the sake of preserving their imperial lifeline and were recognized by
other European powers as the guardian of the canal, or at least the de facto guardian.
Britain had also gained alliances with Russia and France and appeared to be on good
terms with its two traditional rivals. Unfortunately new threats emerged and the German
incursions into the Middle East through the rail concession and the Italian acquisition of
African colonies placed two hostile powers on either side of the canal. In particular the
Italians were a concern to the British since their alliance with Germany and their
proximity to the Red Sea enabled them to potentially interfere with canal shipping. Also
the Ottoman Empire had grown increasingly weary of the British infringement upon their
domains. The British seizure of Egypt and the Sudan drove the Ottomans into alliance
with Germany. The repercussions of the Aqaba incident of 1906 portrayed the British as
unlikely to respect the authority of the Sublime Porte and caused the Ottoman
Government to seek allies. Finally, the British alliance with Russia had rendered a
peaceful Anglo-Ottoman coexistence near impossible. When events in Europe came to a
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boil, uncertainty surrounded the canal and each day brought a greater chance of Britain
having to fight for the canal.
The hostilities and the chain reaction from Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s
assassination enveloped Europe in a massive war with Britain, Russia, France, Belgium,
and Serbia arrayed against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Since most of these countries
possessed overseas colonies, it was only logical that those areas would also become sites
of conflict. The Ottoman Empire initially stayed out of the war, but the war forced them
to take a side in 1914. On August 2, 1914 the Ottoman Empire concluded a treaty of
alliance against Russia with the German Empire and secured a buttress to any Russian
territorial aggrandizement.1 Two days later the British government purchased two
Dreadnought battleships they had been building for the Ottoman Government and left the
Ottoman navy severely weakened.2 The Germans sailed their Mediterranean squadron
into Ottoman waters, hoisted the Ottoman flag, and were thus commissioned part of the
Ottoman navy. The Ottomans said the acquisition of the German squadron of a battle
cruiser and light cruiser were necessary replacements for the ships detained by the
British.3 On October 29, the Ottoman navy attacked the Russian ports of Odessa,
Sebastopol, Novorossik, and Feodosia, precipitating a Russian declaration of war on the
Ottomans on November 1 and a British declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire by
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November 3.4 Sultan Mehmed V declared a holy war, which was permissible due to his
status as successor to the Muslim Caliphate, and called upon all Muslim subjects in
French, Russian, and British territories to rise against their imperial masters.5 The worst
fears of the British had come to fruition.
The Ottoman entry into World War I confirmed British fears and placed the route
to India in jeopardy. The state of war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire also
diverted British forces destined for dispatch to the Western front. The fear of a Muslim
insurgency among British forces and in their imperial holdings generated fears of another
Great Revolt. The British faced the same dilemma that they faced in 1800, how to defend
the Home Islands and India in the face of an enemy. In World War I the canal served as a
conduit for troops from the empire as they embarked to aid the Crown in Europe. Early in
the war, Winston Churchill of the Admiralty and Minister of War Lord Kitchener
discussed the necessity of securing the canal so that Indian troops could be dispatched to
the main theater of combat.6 Prior to the Ottoman entry into the war, the War Office had
envisaged the canal as a necessary holding to convey imperial troops. The Ottoman entry
into the war shattered this plan. The Ottoman threat left the canal open to martial activity
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and also opened the possibility of a Muslim insurgency against the British in India and
her other eastern possessions.7
The canal became a theater of war and a line of defense for Britain, as Hallberg
had foreseen.8 Anglo-Ottoman hostilities necessitated a change in the administration in
Egypt. Despite the ramifications of the Aqaba incident, Egypt was still technically under
the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire and this status left the British in an odd situation.
They could not very well defend Egypt against her rightful controllers and thus the
British government would have to take steps to remedy the situation. Also, the British
perceived the Ottoman war aims to be the taking of Egypt, Western India, Persia, and
Suez, all of which would greatly weaken the empire if successful.9 The British professed
a desire to avoid direct responsibility for Egypt and had acted under the Egyptian flag
since 1882, but due to the outbreak of World War I the British had to make a decision to
evacuate Egypt or assume direct control.
Prior to the Ottoman declaration of war, the British pressured the Egyptian
government to issue a proclamation pointing out that the British occupation rendered
Egypt open to attacks from Britain’s enemies and forbade Egyptians from all financial
and commercial dealings with Britain’s enemies.10 The proclamation also urged
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Egyptians to offer any possible aid to Great Britain.11 On November 2, 1914, three days
before the Ottoman declaration of war, Sir John Maxwell, commander of British forces in
Egypt, proclaimed martial law in Egypt and announced the British assumption of
Egyptian defense burdens.12 The British suspected many Egyptians of harboring proOttoman sympathies, after all Britain was the occupying power. The British had to
choose between two ways of incorporating Egypt into the empire: annex Egypt or declare
a protectorate. Since the British were in Egypt for the sake of the canal it made little
sense to fully incorporate Egypt into the empire, so the protectorate was the most
advisable option. Additionally, the Khedive had reaffirmed his loyalty to the Sultan and
quickly saw his office abolished when the British declared the protectorate. On December
18-19, 1914, the British government formally announced the protectorate,
His Brittanic Majesty’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice
that in view of the state of war arising out of the actions of Turkey, Egypt
is placed under the protection of his majesty and will henceforth constitute
a British Protectorate. The Suzerainty of Turkey is terminated.13

The threat to the canal and the benefit it afforded the empire resulted in direct British
control over Egypt. The British avoided this assumption for years, but when the
Ottomans threatened the canal through invasion, the British took steps to secure their
most vital interest in the region. With the canal secured, the British awaited the long
feared attack on the canal.
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During World War I, the canal’s value to the empire would be tested and the
British Government forced to deploy troops to defend the canal. In January of 1915,
reports of a twenty thousand man Ottoman force advancing towards the canal thrust the
Cairo Office into a panic.14 The Cairo Office was the British military and Foreign Office
Headquarters in the Middle East. The pending attack was also particularly frightening
since many of the occupation troops had been sent to Europe in August to aid the British
Expeditionary Force and most regular forces were bound for the Western front.15 The
War Office adopted a defensive strategy around the canal. The War Office was
determined to use any available manpower to defend the canal and forbade any further
troop transfers from the Egyptian garrison.16 As a benefit, the canal served its role as a
staging area for imperial troops destined for the Western front. By January 1915,
Territorial troops replacing regular Egyptian garrison forces and troops from India,
Australia, and New Zealand on their way to the front, a total of seventy thousand troops,
filled Egypt.17 On the opposing side, the Ottomans prepared an expeditionary force for
dispatch to Egypt to conquer the canal and the commander in chief of this force, Djemal
Pasha, was already referring to himself as the “savior of Egypt.”18 The coming attack led
the British to station a Lancashire Division, two divisions of Indian infantry, and
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Australasian troops along the canal forming a defensive line, as well as Anglo-French
naval troops being stationed in the canal. Turkish patrols opened fire on British posts on
January 26, 1915.19 The next day, Britain suspended traffic through the canal in
preparation for the hostilities.20 On February 3, the main Ottoman attack commenced, but
was spotted before it began by French aerial reconnaissance. A sandstorm and the British
defense repulsed the attack and only one crossing pontoon was even placed in the water.
The much ballyhooed attack on the canal was defeated. One more Ottoman assault
occurred in June and July of 1916 and was also easily repulsed.21 These attacks
confirmed to the British the need to maintain a large British garrison in Egypt. Minister
of War Kitchener pronounced the defensive strategy of the canal as doomed to failure and
wanted the Ottoman Empire toppled so troops could be sent to the Western Front.22
Kitchener believed that keeping a large number of troops in Egypt for defensive purposes
was hampering the main war effort in Europe and wanted the Middle Eastern Campaign
won as soon as possible. With the repulse of the July Ottoman attack, the canal was safe
and the area became a starting point for Lawrence and Allenby. The security of the canal
allowed the empire to focus on toppling the Ottoman Empire. In 1917, the Indian army
overcame stubborn Ottoman resistance and captured Baghdad.23 Allenby took control of
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) and was determined to break the stalemate that
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existed around Gaza. The Ottoman forces along with some German units had established
a defensive line around Gaza and used it as a last stand to prevent the British from
entering into the heartland of the Ottoman Empire.24 Employing a massive artillery
bombardment and a gallant cavalry charge by the Australian Light Horse, the EEF
overtook Gaza and forced an Ottoman retreat.25 Jerusalem fell on December 9 and
Allenby, flanked by allied officers, walked into Jerusalem on foot to accept the surrender
of the city, as British troops occupied the Holy Lands.26 The EEF under Allenby broke
Turkish resistance at Megiddo on September 19-21, 1918 and on October 30 the Ottoman
Government signed an armistice on the island of Lemnos.27 The imagery of the British
forces winning a triumphal victory at the site of the first battle and the prophesized site of
Armageddon served to enamor the British public. However, Allenby was not the most
celebrated of the British commanders. That title fell to T.E. Lawrence, better known as
Lawrence of Arabia.
Lawrence was a member of the Arab Bureau and had been sent to the Arabian
Peninsula to find a leader to lead the Arabs to victory over the Ottomans.28 The Arab
Bureau was an organization of Middle East experts organized by the Foreign Office. The
Arab Bureau had three critical objectives: “protect the imperial trunk routes to India,
mollify anticipated upsurge in Arab demands for self-government through the medium of
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British sponsored client state, and obviate the burden of postwar annexation and/or
occupation.”29 The Bureau wanted to raise an Arab insurrection to aid the British attacks
on the Ottoman Empire and to siphon off Ottoman troops. The main accomplishment of
the Arab Revolt, in which Lawrence played a great role, was the seizure of Aqaba.
Lawrence remarked that it was his destiny to take part in the revolt and the conquest of
Aqaba.30 The rationale for this seizure was Aqaba’s presence on the eastern side of the
Red Sea and the ability control of Aqaba offered the Ottomans to close the route to
Suez.31 The revolt consisted of guerrilla raids by Bedouins loyal to the Hashemite clan.
Lawrence wanted to make the Arab revolt an engine to his own success, a handmaid to
the British Egyptian campaign, and to lead this revolt.32 Lawrence and his forces harassed
the Ottoman armies as Allenby advanced into Palestine. While Allenby gained victory
over the Ottomans, witnessed his troops dispatched to Europe, and awaited Indian
reinforcements, Lawrence and Feisal marched on Damascus and proclaimed an Arab
government. Feisal was the son of Sharif Husayn of the Hijaz and the leader of Arab
army; he would later become king of Iraq. The taking of Damascus was in opposition to
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which was a 1916 agreement dividing the Middle East
between Britain and France, and eventually nullified since Syria was promised to France
under Sykes-Picot. While the Arab Revolt accomplished little in terms of the overall
29
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military success of the Middle East Campaign, the adventures of Lawrence served to
captivate the British public and make Lawrence a celebrity.
World War I served to further entrench the canal in the imperial mind. First, the
canal was the starting point for the only wholly British victory of the war. The victorious
British troops began the campaign defending the Suez Canal and started their campaign
from the canal area. They won the Middle East campaign with no help from their allies in
contrast to the Western Front. Additionally, the victorious forces in this campaign
represented all parts of the empire. Britons, Indians, New Zealanders, and Australians
defended the canal. The victories of Lawrence, though embellished to great degree by
Lawrence himself, and Allenby were launched from the canal. Especially coming on the
heels of Gallipoli in 1915-16, the victories restored faith in the British military and were
characterized by a more fluid style of war. The cavalry charge at Gaza, the raids of
Lawrence, and the biblical imagery of Jerusalem, Megiddo, and Allenby’s marching into
Jerusalem on foot, distracted from the harsh trench warfare of the Western front. Finally,
the canal had been fought for by British troops and lives had been lost defending the
canal against Ottoman attacks. If nothing more, it was now a spoil of war and controlled
by the British.
The end of World War I brought murkiness to the position of the Suez Canal in
the imperial mind and strategy. Despite its appeal, the priority for the canal route had
diminished due to the wartime reliance on the Cape Route. Political Scientist Sir
Frederick Maurice stated in a Foreign Affairs article in the aftermath of the war that the
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“canal was not vital to the empire.”33 The canal’s importance shifted from dire
importance, and Suez temporarily moved towards being a holding of lesser substance.
During the war, the British used the Cape Route for shipping since the canal was subject
to mines and German U-Boats roamed the neighboring waters. Beginning in 1915, the
Germans concentrated their submarines in the Mediterranean and sank numerous British
ships, including fifty six in April 1917.34Also, Continental matters did not hamper the
Cape Route and it was less likely to become a combat zone during a European conflict.
The British possession of the majority of Southern Africa and the eviction of the
Germans from their African colonies added a greater level of safety to the Cape Route.
Eventually, the Suez Canal was reopened and convoys allowed for the secure escort of
trading ships.35 Additionally the relative ease with which the British repelled the attacks
on the canal presumably led to some in Britain to disdain the large garrison situated at the
canal. The rationale is the disparity between combat near the canal and combat along the
Western Front. With few casualties in the Middle East compared to the exorbitant
numbers in Europe, many Englishmen questioned the logic of posting such a large
garrison in Egypt. Additionally, the supposed mismanagement of strategy fit in with the
views of the “lost generation.” While these attitudes occurred at the end of the war, they
proved fleeting, similar to the temporary apathy that existed after the initial share
purchase by Disraeli.
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The conclusion of the war changed the British understanding of the canal and
ushered in a renewed period of heightened importance of the canal. The rationale
stemmed from two main areas: postwar settlements and Egyptian independence. The
postwar settlement allowed for self-determination for many former imperial holdings.
But the victors, due to Egypt’s protectorate status, denied a seat at the peace talks held at
Versailles to the Egyptians. The British obtained the legal right to safeguard the canal
through a series of agreements with the Egyptians and the most important being the
Turkish forfeiture of the guardianship of the canal to Britain at the Treaty of Sevres.
Section IX of the Treaty of Sevres stated
Turkey renounces in favor of Great Britain, the powers conferred upon his
Imperial majesty the Sultan by the convention signed at Constantinople on
October 21, 1888 relating to the free navigation of the Suez Canal.36

The British were officially recognized as the guardian of the canal and given the task of
upholding the free navigation of the canal. The British status as guardians of the canal
was affirmed in Article 152 of the Treaty of Versailles where
Germany consents in so far as she is concerned to the transfer to His
Brittanic Majesty’s Government of the powers conferred to His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan by the Convention37

These sentiments were furthered referred to in peace treaties with Austria (Article 107 of
the Treaty of St.Germain), Hungary (Article 91 of the Treaty of Trianon) and Turkey
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(Article 99 of the Treaty of Lausanne).38 The Treaty of Lausanne was signed between the
allies and the newly proclaimed Turkish republic, which formed after the dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire.
Immediately after the end of the First World War, the Egyptians began their move
for independence and the renunciation of the British Protectorate, but the British were
reluctant to relinquish a strategic holding that was described by Lord Milner as “a nodal
point of land, sea, and air communication.”39 The Wafd party led by Saad Zaghul
claimed it represented Egypt and desired to form a government, a desire which was not
reciprocated by the British Government in Cairo. The Wafd party was formed by
members of the landed gentry and legal profession in Egypt and its express goal was the
independence of Egypt.40 The British arrested Zaghul and his associates on March 8,
1919 and rioting began in Lower Egypt, at one point compelling British troops to open
fire.41 Disturbances spread and eight British soldiers were murdered by Egyptians in a
railway carriage at Deirut Station on March 18.42 The British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George appointed Allenby High Commissioner in an effort to restore order and maintain
the Protectorate. Allenby sympathized with the Egyptian people and ordered the release
of the Wafd detainees. Towards the end of 1919, Egyptians murdered more British
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soldiers and some Egyptians were targeted as well.43 As the situation in Egypt worsened,
Allenby traveled to London to convince the Cabinet of the need to end the Protectorate.
In February 1922, Allenby made the announcement granting Egypt independence for the
first time in two thousand years. The Protectorate was abolished and Egypt made
independent, but there were some conditions implied in the recognition. The declaration
which put an end to the protectorate read as follows:
Whereas His Majesty’s Government, in accordance with their declared
intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent
sovereign State; and whereas the relations between his Majesty’s
Government and Egypt are of vital importance to the British Empire, the
following principles are hereby declared
1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated and Egypt is
declared to be a sovereign state
2. As soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of
Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, Martial
Law, as proclaimed on 2 November 1914 shall be withdrawn.
3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion
of His Majesty’s Government until such time as it may be possible
by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to
conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty’s
Government of Egypt:
(a) The security of the communications of the British
Empire in Egypt
(b)The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or
interference, direct or indirect
(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the
protection of minorities
(d) The Sudan.44

While the Egyptians governed themselves, the British maintained what could best be
termed suzerainty over Egypt and the four points of reservation allowed a heavy British
43
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hand in Egypt. The first point referencing the security of imperial communications is
clear reference to the canal and when coupled with the second point of protection from
foreign aggression, cemented the ability of Britain to maintain troops and act in defense
of the canal in Egypt. The British gave up the burden of governing Egypt, but they still
held on to their right to defend the canal and wield considerable influence in Egypt. The
third point also referred to foreign interests and extraterritoriality in Egypt, with the canal
as one the largest interests. Since multiple countries needed the canal to remain open, the
British still upheld the 1888 Convention. Essentially, the granting of Egyptian
independence saw Britain cut all of her administrative ties to Egypt except those
pertaining to her role as canal guardian.
The reserved points formed a constant bone of contention between the Wafdists
and successive British Governments. In 1924 the Labour Government, led by Ramsay
MacDonald, came to power and the new Prime Minister met with Saad Zaghul in the
autumn of that year. Zaghul made five demands aimed at evicting Britain from Egypt, the
most taxing being the demand for Britain to renounce all claims and rights to the Suez
Canal.45 Commons debated Zaghul’s demands. The first issue of concern raised by
MacDonald was the canal, and he summed up British policy by stating,
I raised the question of the Suez Canal straight away because its security is
of vital interest to us both in peace and war. It is no less true today than in
1922 that the security of the communications of the British Empire in
Egypt renders a vital British interest and the absolute certainty that the
Suez Canal remain open in peace as well as in war for the free passage of
45
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British ships is the foundation on which the entire defense policy of the
British Empire rests.46

If any doubt existed to the importance of the Suez Canal to British defense policy,
MacDonald laid those fears to rest. MacDonald referred to the failure of the 1888
Convention and the internationalization of the canal to provide for free transit in World
War I. He reminded Commons that Britain was forced to take steps to maintain the free
passage of the canal and that no British Government would allow the closure of the
canal.47 Macdonald reaffirmed the British policy of no British Government allowing the
closure of the canal, which was also uttered during the 1882 crisis. A January 24, 1927
letter from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Austen Chamberlain to Egyptian High
Commissioner Lord Lloyd conveyed similar sentiments by saying “the protection of the
Suez Canal was considered of such vital importance to Great Britain that she was
unwilling under any circumstances to entrust this to the Egyptian government alone.”48 In
the same debate as MacDonald’s speech, F.C. Thomson, a member of Parliament in
1922, stated “it does not seem to me that there could be any interest more vital to the
British Empire than the preservation of our communications through the Suez Canal.”49
These reserved points hindered Egypt until 1936, when the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
of Alliance resolved the issue. The canal was of dire importance to the British Empire at
this point in time. The canal’s role as a communications nodal point was still apparent
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and the British were so adamant on keeping the canal open to shipping that they would
not allow any other group to administer it. British granting of Egyptian independence was
dependant upon the British exercising their role as canal guardians.
At the conclusion of the multitude of peace conferences and settlements following
World War I, Britain had acquired several territories and mandates in the Middle East
including Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.50 These new possessions served to deepen
British attachment to the region and placed the canal as the centerpiece of the new
empire. The canal occupied a role as the gateway to the exotic lands of the east and
author E.M. Forster thought “somewhere about Suez there is always a social change, the
arrangements of Asia weaken and those of Europe begin to be felt.”51 During the interwar
period, the debate over independence for India began to arise and the former romantic
realm made famous by Kipling waned. However, the Middle East offered a vestige of the
old imperial might where Britain could still make kings. Also a similarity existed in the
new Middle East holdings that paralleled the old way of rule in India. As historian David
Cannadine observed, “the Arab emirs and sheikhs seemed like the Indian princes and
Nigerian emirs, only more so noble and superior leaders, the patrons and protectors of a
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traditional ordered world, which once existed but was now under serious threat.”52 While
India was still the most important imperial holding, the social structure and British power
in India were diminishing. Essentially, the Middle East offered a new place for the British
to rule absolutely, while they still maintained India and attempted to alter their rule to
maintain their control. The old romantic imagery of Britain ruling supreme over exotic
lands in India was in danger of being eradicated, but the lands of the mandates offered a
replacement. Cannadine continued, “the growing attachment to the Arab World, by turn
patrician, romantic, and escapist, coincided with the gradual extension of British power
into the Middle East.”53 British dominance over states formed under their auspices and
the influence they wielded over the monarchs of these lands allowed for a sense of
traditional empire. After all, the Middle East was the land of Lawrence and his
adventures, which were growing ever popular with the publication of his books and the
traveling lecture tour. The British created kings in these regions and did so under the
condition these loyal monarchs accept their advice and preserve imperial
communications.54 These new possessions allowed for the preservation of the canal,
ensured the security of the canal with the buffer of Palestine, and completed an overland
communications and air route to India through Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq.
The security benefits for Britain were immense and the British ability to make rulers
along the lines of those in the Indian Princely State rendered the Middle East a substitute
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India.55 The canal formed the key to these lands and the tales of the adventures of
Lawrence and later adventures of Glubb. The canal was the centerpiece of the new
empire in the Middle East.
After the 1920s, the canal dropped in importance based on regional issues, the
dominant spirit of peace stemming from Locarno, the Washington Naval Conference, and
Kellogg-Briand, a pacifist British public, and the changing world order. The 1928
Kellogg-Briand Pact was signed by virtually all states, who agreed to refrain from
military action as a way to settle international disputes.56 The Treaty of Locarno was the
settling of Germany’s western borders.57 Locarno also was an agreement among the
major powers of Europe to settle conflict through peaceful means. The Washington Naval
Conference took place from 1921 to 1922 and placed proportional limits on the naval
strength of the world navies.58 The conference was hailed by United States Secretary for
State Frank Kellogg as a great step towards peace.59 The result of these three treaties was
the birth of the spirit of Locarno, essentially a sense of the end of the age of war. Though
at the end of the First World War the canal had emerged as the swing door of the empire
and the vital lifeline without which the empire could not stand, this shifted in the 1930s
as the empire began to question its own power. The swing door distinction derived from
both economic and political concerns. Economically, the canal allowed for the continued
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flow of trade between Britain and her empire. Politically, the canal allowed for a linkage
of the empire and the ready dispatch of British or Indian troops to defend the empire. The
British army decreased in size during this period of time. The fallout of World War I and
the emergence of the so called “lost generation” left many Britons unwilling to support
any martial activity.60 The army became stigmatized and beset by “a pacifist electorate, a
parsimonious treasury, and uncertainty over its role.”61 The War Ministry was unpopular
with the British public and the officer ranks rife with resignations.62 The focus on air
defenses left the British army in disrepair and presumably unable to maintain the defense
of the empire.63 The British Government placed their faith in the Air Ministry defending
the empire and ignored the army, which had suffered so much during the last conflict.
The government also adopted the Cardwell system which advocated equal forces to be
allotted for home and imperial defense leaving the majority of the army stationed in
Britain or in India.64 For example the British stationed forty-five battalions in India and
only six in Egypt. The gateway to India and the canal, which had been the scene of two
British military activities, became expendable.65 The Kellogg-Briand Pact and the spirit
of Locarno mesmerized the British Government and British ministers believed that no
future war would occur. It ordered the military on the Ten Year Rule, calling for the
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armed forces of the empire not to prepare for war for ten years.66 While the Ten Year
Rule was also a cost cutting measure, the willingness of the Government in disallowing
military preparation meant that in any future conflict, the British lagged behind countries
that had maintained military preparations. In terms of the Middle East, the British
Government left only minimal detachments of the army, presumably only enough to
subvert any local rising. The reason for the troop reduction in the Middle East was
described by historian Elizabeth Monroe, “Britain remained paramount in the Middle
East, unchallenged by any power of equal magnitude and able to maintain order thanks to
the security and aura of empire and its ability to summon reinforcements from India and
Malta in time of need.”67 Monroe believed that there was no need for more troops in the
Middle East at this time. At the end of this redeployment, one cavalry brigade, one tank
brigade, and one infantry brigade defended the canal and Egypt, a far cry from the
seventy thousand men of the EEF who defended the canal during World War I.
Developments in Iraq and Egypt led to some indecision with regards to the canal.
The weakness stemmed from the perceived weakness of Britain in the region due to
treaty concessions during the 1930s. Iraq had become a vital imperial center for fly over
purposes and it was a chain in the Indian shield that began at Suez. In 1930, the British
signed a treaty of alliance granting Iraqi independence and severely restricting their
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military presence in Iraq.68 The treaty allowed the Royal Air Force to retain four bases
and the British assured responsibility for the defense of Iraq. The British created a pliant
monarchy for the sake of preserving imperial communications.69 The treaty with Iraq was
followed shortly by renewed negotiations with Egypt. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
of Alliance settled the point of reservation included in the 1922 Declaration. The treaty
replaced the British military occupation with an alliance and called for the termination of
the British military presence in Egypt.70 Article VIII preserved the canal stating:
In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, while being an integral part of
Egypt, is a universal means of communication between the different parts
of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time as
the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position
to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of the
navigation of the Canal, authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to
stations forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in a zone
specified in the annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in cooperation with the Egyptian forces the defense of the Canal.71

Article VIII also created the Canal Zone, which was to be controlled and administered by
Britain and would become one of the largest military bases in the world. The Annex
allowed for a twenty-year period of British occupation before the Egyptians took full
control of the defense of the canal and read:
It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years specified in
Article 16 the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer
necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian army is in a position to
68
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ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of
the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be
submitted to the council of the League of Nations for decision in
accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of the
signature of the present treaty or to such other persons for decision in
accordance with such other procedures as the High Contracting Parties
may agree.72

While the British ended a costly military occupation, they managed to maintain their
presence in the canal area and to defend it for twenty more years. The interesting
development is Britain’s willingness to part with the occupation of Egypt and supposed
consideration of entrusting Egypt with the defense of the canal in the future. The
rationale stretched a long distance from the attitude of the MacDonald Government, but
the treaty agreements regarding the canal were most likely an attempt to stall a handover
for the foreseeable future. The reason was that Britain was still weakened from World
War I, suffering monetary issues, disinclined to martial activity, and most importantly, a
larger issue in the world loomed: fascism.
In the early 1930s, the threats to the British Empire came from two sources: Japan
and Italy. During World War I, Japan was a British ally and acted to protect British
interests in the Far East; but, times had changed. By the 1930s, the Anglo-Japanese
alliance was terminated and Japan was now ruled by a military government. The British
desired to pursue closer ties with the Americans and allowed the military alliance with
Japan to lapse in the 1920s.73 A cooperative agreement between the United States,
72
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Britain, Japan, and France replaced the naval treaty between Japan and Britain.74 This
suspicion of Japanese hostility led to considerations of the eastern holdings. The
Washington Naval Conference limited the size of the Japanese navy, but left the Japanese
the dominant naval power in the Pacific.75 Japan also felt slighted by the proportions se at
the conference and the British termination of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.76 British
policy makers decided to use Singapore as the forward base in the Far East and in time of
trouble to dispatch half of the main fleet to the Far East.77 Italy was not considered a
threat and it was not believed that the British could defend the Home Islands, Egypt, and
the Far East simultaneously. The Italian incursions into Abyssinia threatened the British
position in the region and placed the canal in danger. While Britain allowed Italian troop
movements through the canal, there was the possibility of these transports disembarking
their troops and claiming the canal. The conquest of Abyssinia further entrenched Italy on
either side of the canal, when coupled with her control of Libya. The British had the
opportunity to prevent the Italian invasion by closing the canal to their warships, but the
British chose not to and wished to avoid fighting the Italian army. The British fear of the
Italians demonstrated the diminution of British martial strength, effect of the spirit of
Locarno after World War I, and the folly of the Ten Year Rule. The threat of the Italians
led the British to undertake the terms of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, which
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generated a benefit in the forcing of the Egyptians to acknowledge the vital role of the
canal for imperial communications and the granting of RAF flyover rights. The British
assumed that no power would challenge their hold over the Middle East and they
concentrated on the Japanese threat to their eastern holdings. The dispute between the
RAF and Admiralty had led to the defenses on Malta becoming neglected and the British
proved unprepared to deal with a Mediterranean threat.78 The RAF and Admiralty
believed their respective branches were best suited for defense in coming conflicts. The
Chamberlain Government even contemplated withdrawal from the region to avoid
conflict.79 The 1937 Imperial Conference called for the Far East to be the priority for
imperial defense and advocated a doctrine of self-sufficiency for the defense of Egypt.80
Self-sufficiency required the three brigades in Egypt to hold out as long as possible
against any invasion and to await reinforcements.81 While a rapprochement was pursued
with Italy, the canal was relegated by policy makers to less important than the Singapore
base and only allotted three divisions for defense. The rapprochement allowed a sense of
Mediterranean security and gave British planners time to focus on the defense of the Far
East.
Some British statesmen called for the Government to sacrifice the Mediterranean
due to the disrepair of the British Navy and the need to defend India. Foreign Minister
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Anthony Eden believed that the Mediterranean could be lost and later regained if
necessary.82 In years past when the threats came from Europe the canal had been the
security of India; with the increased perception of the Japanese threat, Singapore proved
the key. The Committee of Imperial Defense so preoccupied itself with a three front war
that they postulated a plan to have the French Navy guard the canal.83 Circumstances in
1938 necessitated another shift in canal importance as it became more and more likely
that Italy would be a likely opponent of Britain in any future war. Italian involvement in
the Spanish Civil War, Italian rearmament, and the increase of the garrison in Abyssinia
worried London and foreshadowed Italian aggression.84 British policy makers believed
that the control of the canal allowed Britain to sever the Italian communications to her
East African colonies and to secure Alexandria, which would be the main British base in
any conflict.85 Also in any future conflict, the powerful Indian army would be needed to
aid the war effort. In 1938 reinforcements began to be dispatched to Egypt and were
agreed to by Egyptian Government, which had grown fearful of the increased troop
Italian deployments to Libya. The Admiralty dispatched the Mediterranean fleet to
Alexandria.86 The British had flip-flopped for a few years over the importance of the
canal versus that of Singapore; but, as the Second World War approached, the canal
regained its place as a necessary holding for the British Empire. The reasons for the
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vacillation stemmed from the multiple threats facing the empire. When Japan appeared
the most likely enemy, Singapore received priority at the expense of canal defense. Also,
the vacillation stemmed from a limited amount of money and supplies, resulting in
whichever base was threatened, be it Suez or Singapore, received troops and support. But
when the canal was threatened, the pendulum swung back to defense of the canal as
primary.
In 1939, Winston Churchill proclaimed the Mediterranean England’s first
battlefield and the Egyptian Government asked for even more British troops to be
dispatched. 87 The British Government decided that despite some initial trepidation over
the ability to hold Egypt during a war, the canal had to be held and the Mediterranean
won. The detriment was that for this strategy to work the United States had to use their
fleet to check the Japanese fleet in the Pacific and the Franklin Roosevelt Administration
was more willing to preserve their isolationist stance than to actually aid against Japan.88
While this strategy failed, the British had committed themselves to preserving Egypt.
However, in the event of conflict with Italy, Egypt was the jumping off point from which
Britain could attack Libya and Abyssinia and strangle Italian communications and
colonies. The 1939 St. James Conference stressed the importance of Egypt as a hub of
communications and it was grouped as one of the three most important holdings in the
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region.89 In 1939, Britain strengthened its air defenses around the canal in 1939 and the
British prepared for another defense of the canal against a European enemy. While the
initial strategic planning had painted the canal as expendable in favor of Singapore, the
realization of a European conflict left Britain with no choice but to defend the canal. Such
a defense sought to prevent any incursion against Egypt or their position in the Middle
East. The problem was that the Ten Year Rule and Cardwell system had weakened the
British military and left it unprepared for war.
The Second World War once again saw the return of hostilities to Egypt and
rekindled the omnipresent fear of an attack on the canal. The Churchill Government
decided to make a stand in the Mediterranean and forsake their earlier plans to dispatch
the fleet to Singapore.90 Early British experience in the war showed the lingering effects
of the Ten Year rule and saw the British Expeditionary Force swept from the Continent
saved only by the miracle of Dunkirk.91 While the Germans overran British resistance in
Europe, the Italians declared war on June 10, 1940. Their declaration implied attacks
against Suez and Gibraltar.92 The British responded by refusing canal entry to the ships of
both Germany and Italy.93 The British forces in the canal placed guards at the two entry
points to the canal and stopped all ships from entering the canal without security
89
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clearances. British commanders in Egypt clamored for anti-aircraft batteries.94 The Italian
air force mounted some air attacks on the canal, but the inaccurate Italian bombing
resulted in little damage. Additionally; the troop buildups in the Italian African colonies
suggested a land attack. The British stopped the Italian naval threat on November 11-12,
1940 when the Royal Navy sank three Italian battleships in their moorings and confirmed
the British dominance of the naval portion of the Mediterranean theater.95 While the canal
may have been temporarily secured, it was feared that the main attack on the canal would
come from the land as in World War I.
The land portion of the North African Campaign would be decided along the
borders between Libya and Egypt. The Italians had stationed over 215,000 troops in
Libya, and they confronted fifty thousand British troops in Egypt.96 Campaigning in
North Africa took the form of a shoving match with the Axis attempting to push their
way into Egypt in an effort to take the canal with the British impeding their efforts and
attempting to push the Axis out of North Africa. The Italians mentioned reclaiming the
Roman Empire and the War Cabinet became determined to defend Egypt and sent the
best available armor to Egypt.97 Notably the Churchill Government made this decision
during the height of the Battle of Britain and heightened the importance of Egypt and the
canal. The Italian advance on Egypt began in the summer of 1940 and the British Long
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Range Desert patrol harassed their advance.98 Churchill lobbied for more troops to be
dispatched to Egypt and troops from all over the empire began to arrive. Once again the
canal was the conduit for imperial troops to rally to the crown and defend the artery of
the empire.99 In 1940, Churchill wrote to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and
Australia informing them of the decision to keep the fleet at Alexandria and called on
India and Australasia to dispatch any available troops to Egypt. At the same time as the
British fleet defeated the Italians, the British forces in Egypt pushed the Italian army back
to Tobruk and were on the verge of claiming victory in the region.100 The British had
staved off defeat in Europe and secured the canal through their victories in Egypt.
Churchill commented. “by the end of that year this small and ancient island, with its
devoted Commonwealth, Dominions, and attachments under every sky had proved itself
capable of bearing the whole impact and weight of world destiny.”101 Defeating the
Italians in North Africa was a temporary reason for self-congratulation, but then the
Germans got involved in the campaign.
On September 6, 1940, Admiral Raeder of the German Navy suggested to Hitler
of the need to take the canal before United States aid arrived and Hitler resolved to drive
the British from the canal. 102 Yet again, a British enemy had decided that the best way to
hamper the empire was to take the canal. On January 18-19, 1941, the Luftwaffe attacked
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installations along the canal and dropped mines into the canal.103 The presence of mines
resulted in repeated closures of the canal and the British dispatched all available mine
clearing equipment to the canal.104 Additionally, the shipping problems caused by
German air attacks delayed the arrival of anti-aircraft equipment and that equipment did
not arrive until spring, rendering the canal vulnerable to German attacks. Germany had
initially intended to send troops to aid the Italian war effort, but reassigned them to
Greece in October of 1940.105 The AfrikaKorps arrived in February of 1941 and the
general who led the troops was the most feared German commander of the war: Erwin
Rommel.106 Rommel’s forces began to regain ground lost by the Italians and forced the
British forces to retreat over three hundred miles.107 Rommel defeated the British forces
and captured the vital fuel depot/port of Tobruk, thereby infuriating Churchill.108 The fall
of Torbuk was the second largest British capitulation of the war and 35,000 British
prisoners were taken.109 Upon hearing of the fall of Tobruk, Churchill remarked, “defeat
is one thing, disgrace is another.”110The Germans were getting dangerously close to the
canal. Something had to be done by the British.
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Churchill decided to make Bernard Montgomery commander of the British Eighth
Army and he hoped that Montgomery could find a way to stunt the German advance.
Montgomery began to make a myth for himself starting with his appointment. As
Montgomery was walking to the plane to take him to Egypt, he spoke of a great general
who won many victories only to be defeated in the desert. At this statement, his aide
reassured of him of his chances versus Rommel, and Montgomery responded that he had
been talking about Rommel.111 Montgomery took control and began preparations for a
showdown with Rommel. He refused Churchill’s call for a September offensive because
he did not want to fight until he was ready. In August of 1942, Britain prepared Cairo for
street to street fighting and the British Army issued rifles to civil servants, few hoped of
stopping Rommel.112 But Montgomery had hope and benefited from the Royal Air
Force’s sinking of Axis shipping to North Africa.113 The lack of supplies bought vital
time for Montgomery to supply and train.
In late October and early November, the Battle of Alamein commenced with the
Germans attacking the Eighth Army and the Eighth stopping their advance once and for
all. The battle was a triumph for the Eighth Army, composed of men from Britain, India,
Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The British beat back the supposedly
invincible Afrikakorps and the Eighth began to push the Axis forces westward towards
Tunisia. By January 1943, the British entered Tripoli and the North African theater was
111
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won. The victory at Alamein proved a triumph of tactics and the use of the superior
manpower of the Eighth Army.114 At Tripoli, Churchill addressed the men of the British
Eighth Army saying, “ever since your victory at Alamein, you have nightly pitched your
moving tents a day’s march nearer home. In days to come when people ask what you did
in the Second World War, it will be enough to say: I marched with the Eighth Army.”115
By the end of 1943, the British evicted the Axis from North Africa and the canal was safe
because as Montgomery stated, “the Eighth Army never withdraws.”116 The battle of
Alamein was the beginning of the end for the German war effort and began a series of
Allied victories. As Churchill noted, “before Alamein we never had a victory, after
Alamein we never had a defeat.”117
The end of World War II also brought about a momentous shift in the world
political spectrum. Britain perceived itself to have borne the brunt of a German attack and
was, along with the rest of Europe, in need of rebuilding. Fascism was defeated and
Germany divided, but the end of the war also left the world torn between the two
superpowers: the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Cold
War became an event filled with diplomatic intrigue and proxy wars where each side
claimed regions of the world for their influence. And the Cold War confronted Britain
with a decision to make. They could make a claim to being a world power; after all, the
empire was still intact and the British were one of the victorious allies in the war.
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However, Britain was not in any economic or political state to compete with the two
other powers. Additionally, the forces of nationalism and calls for decolonization became
overwhelming as many parts of the empire called for independence, most notably India in
1947. The only region under firm British control was the Middle East and the British
controlled the region to safeguard of the route to India and to defend the canal. The canal
remained under British control as the Cold War began and the Middle East took on
renewed importance in the geopolitical contest. Britain attempted to define its role in the
Cold War and still laid claim to dominance in the Middle East. The British viewed their
role as holding the Middle East against the forces of communism. The most important
holding in the Middle East was the canal. Ironically the canal sparked the events that led
to the downfall of the British Empire.

95

Chapter IV
Parting Ways with the Canal: Postwar British Policy and the Struggle with Nasser

The British emerged among the victorious in World War II and as the dominant
power in the Middle East. Though weakened by war, the British Empire had survived its
most dire test, but the tide of world politics was changing. During the period from 1945
to 1956, Britain’s role in world affairs changed and Britain also endured indecision over
the importance of the canal in its foreign policy. One of the main reasons for control of
the canal vanished when India gained independence on 15 August 1947.1 The loss of
India robbed the canal of its first importance and the Labour Government of Attlee
pondered withdrawing from the canal. The British obligated themselves to withdraw
from Egypt by 1956 under the terms of the 1936 Treaty of Alliance, but the canal took on
renewed importance during the Cold War. During this period British policy towards the
canal can be divided into two main phases: realization and regression. Realization
encompasses the British attempts to deal with the Middle East in light of the changing
world political scene. Essentially, the realization phase represents British attempts to
move from a heavy handed approach to the region to one of more equality through
alliances. The phase of realization occurred under the Attlee Government. During this
period, the British Government evacuated the Middle East and created alliances with the
1
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countries of the region. In the late 1940s, the British showed a willingness to withdraw
from Egypt and relocate to an alternative base in Palestine or Libya. The termination of
the Palestine Mandate ended British hopes of finding an alternative base and
demonstrated the inability of the Arab states to defend themselves against military attack.
Prior to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the British had hoped to develop the Arab States into
an economic and political entity that, with Anglo-American assistance, could serve as a
bulkhead against communist intrusion.2 The phase of regression began with the return of
the Conservative Party to power in Great Britain in 1951. The regressive phase refers to
British policy returning to a heavy handed approach in the Middle East. Though
responsible for the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the Governments of Churchill and Eden
acted with a heavy hand in the Middle East and influenced the region much as they had
prior to World War II. The Conservative policy met with minimal success and was
defeated by Egypt in efforts to form the Baghdad Pact, the dismissal of Glubb, and the
Suez Crisis. By the end of this period, the British withdrew from the canal but later
returned to the region to guarantee its international character. The British refusal to act in
accordance with changing political tides and their failure to realize their power in
comparison with the Soviet Union and United States resulted in the failure of Britain to
keep the canal open. The canal had occupied a central role in the policy of many British
Governments and, ironically, began the end of the empire.
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The end of the Second World War divided the world political scene between the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with Britain on the sidelines.
Nevertheless, the British still viewed themselves as a world power and wanted to
maintain their influence. Cold War pressure encouraged an exaggerated notion of
imperial interest with the Middle East occupying extreme importance.3 The
independence of India took away the region’s role as the gateway to the Indian Empire,
but afforded the region a certain level of importance. Immediately after the war, the
Middle East was the one region in the world where American or Soviet influence was not
universal and Britain acted as the custodian of Western interests.4 As historian John
Darwin noted, “Egypt was the heart of the British strategy in the Middle East and the war
had proven the incalculable asset the land was in war with airfields, a large labor force,
agriculture, position, and above all the canal.5 Bernard Montgomery, the hero of World
War II, stressed the importance of the Suez base and having the installations in Egypt
available “for use by our forces in war and … the right to station forces in strategic area
and to move them in and through the Middle East.”6 While Britain viewed itself as a vital
player in the Cold War, that view came to resemble more of an illusion during the post
war period.
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Harold Macmillan, who later became prime minister after the Suez crisis of 1956,
evaluated the situation in post-war Britain saying,
Britain’s weakness had been temporarily concealed by the glamour of our
victory. Authority had been enhanced by the single handed resistance to
Hitler in 1940-41 and by the disproportionate number of forces which
Great Britain had put into the field and their splendid feats of arms.7

While Montgomery advocated the indispensability of the Middle East and the use of the
region to meet any aggression from the East, Macmillan wanted to maintain friendly
terms with the Soviet Union.8 Macmillan realized the diminution of British power. He
also wanted to secure Commonwealth support for British foreign policy and “reduce our
forces as was consistent with the maintenance of our influence.”9 The differing views
held by Montgomery and Macmillan foreshadowed the pendulum of British policy
towards the Middle East from 1945 to 1956. Many in Britain advocated the maintenance
of world power status and standing guard in the region against the forces of communism
while others were aware of the declining power of Britain. The one aspect both sides of
the dispute agreed upon was the importance of the Suez Canal, be it for defensive
purposes or for access to Middle Eastern oil. As political scientists Leon Epstein noted
prior to World War II, “the Suez Canal emerged as the imperial lifeline, the basis of
Britain’s world trade, and the route to India.” 10 While correct, the canal did not as much
emerge but regained the status it held prior to the wars. By the beginning of 1946, the
7
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Middle East proved important to Britain and the one area where her power remained
paramount; the incoming Attlee government, though, took a different view.
The Labour Government pursued a different foreign policy than Churchill’s
Wartime Government and moved away from the previous heavy handed policy in the
Middle East, but still maintained influence. The main proponent of this policy was
Ernest Bevin, the Labour Foreign Minister. Bevin believed the Middle East was second
in importance to Europe and that traditional intervention undermined the role of Britain
in the region.11 The regeneration and maintenance of British influence was the only path
to preserve Britain’s world status and to avoid relegation to the status of the
Netherlands.12 Despite believing in the benefit of the empire, Bevin believed in the need
to replace the empire in the Middle East with partnership. The Suez base remained
important and Attlee viewed it as necessary for oil, while Churchill believed the base to
be the geographical key to the Middle East and one of the supreme geopolitical positions
in the entire world.13 With the loss of India, the geographical relevance of Egypt lessened
and Bevin looked for other areas to relocate the British base. The most apparent choice
was Palestine. The problem was the British still viewed the Middle East as the focal
point of communications with the empire and Commonwealth, a source of oil, a shield to
Africa, and an irreplaceable offensive base, all which hinged on the maintenance of
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Suez.14 The British military presence at Suez allowed Britain to dominate the region and
maintain their influence. The control of the Suez base safeguarded the passage of oil and
preserved imperial communications. Also, the base served as a shield to Africa since the
British presence provided an impediment to any Soviet threat to the region.
The Suez Base suffered a severe lessening in importance during the early Labour
Government. While the military viewed the base as necessary to deter Soviet incursions,
Bevin was willing to relocate the base to Cyrenaica. Despite Bevin’s views, the military
viewed the Suez Canal as “vital to all British calculations, one of the principal
justifications in imperial defense, the protection of the Indian Empire might no longer
exist, but it remained the principal route to the East and a symbol of imperial power.”15
The Egyptian populace wanted the British to leave and the Egyptians longed for the unity
of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown. Unity of the Nile Valley called for the
union of Sudan and Egypt under the Egyptian monarchy, but had nothing to do with the
canal. The British actions of strong arming King Farouk into accepting a Nationalist
Government during the war humiliated Egypt and inspired Egyptian Nationalists. The
Labour party advocated the withdrawal from Egypt on July 5, 1946 and entered into
discussions to hand over the canal, a change in policies unfathomable only a few years
earlier.16
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Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Sidqi led an Egyptian delegation to London in
1946 to discuss revisions to the 1936 Treaty of Alliance and announced that he was in
favor of a new alliance with Britain based on the complete evacuation of British forces
from Egypt.17 Sidqi also agreed to leave the question of Sudan out of the treaty and
reached an agreement with Bevin in London. The treaty entailed the evacuation of
British troops from Egypt by 1949.18 Bevin’s offer assailed the emotional and
psychological basis of the imperialists in Britain.19 The British base at Suez stood as one
of the largest military bases in the world and a testimony to British industriousness and
resourcefulness. Additionally, the perceived sense of losing the canal was momentous
since many British soldiers had perished to preserve the canal, only to see it handed back
to the Egyptians in a matter of years. The agreement implied the lessening of Britain’s
status in the Middle East due to the paramount status of the canal in the British position
in the region. The agreement fell apart due to miscommunications between the two
governments; in addition political rivalries resulted in the resignation of the Sidqi
Government. The essential point was the willingness of the Labour Government to part
with the canal. Another policy shift had occurred in relation to the Suez Canal. Only
years removed from British soldiers perishing defending the canal against the forces of
fascism, the British believed the canal was expendable.
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The rationale for the attempted withdrawal from Egypt was in accordance with
the Labour strategy of propping up the Arab states as a bulwark against communism. The
end of the Palestine Mandate and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War scuttled this strategy and the
prospect of withdrawal from Egypt. The British decision to relinquish her mandatory
power in Palestine and the subsequent creation of Israel exposed the weakness of the
Arab states, countered British plans for an alternative base in Palestine, and lessened
British prestige in the region.20 The relinquishment of the mandate fostered a sense of
betrayal in the Arab world directed towards the British. Additionally, the Israeli defeat of
the armies of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan proved the inability of the Arab
armies to act in coordination or to achieve success. The hope of utilizing the Arab states
to forestall a communist attack fell apart and the British realized that their continued
presence in the region was required. The character of British foreign policy took a drastic
change with the return of the Conservatives to office in 1951.
The Conservative Government of Churchill returned in 1951 with Anthony Eden
as Foreign Secretary. While Parliament was in recess, the Egyptian Government
abrogated the 1899 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the 1936 Treaty of Alliance,
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thereby proclaiming unity of the Nile Valley.21 Though the abrogation accomplished
little, it was a symbolic action demonstrating the Egyptian Government’s desire to
confront Britain. Also in 1951, Egyptian labor was withdrawn from the Canal Zone and
terrorist activity in the area increased.22 Rioting and attacks against British soldiers began
in 1945 after there was no British move to evacuate Cairo.23 The Egyptians wanted to
force the issue of British withdrawal and force Britain to the negotiating table. In January
1952, a British attack on an Egyptian police barracks touched off anti-foreign riots and
resulted in attacks on British buildings and the massacre of several Englishmen.24 Later in
1952, the Egyptian monarchy was abolished and a military junta installed. On 23 July
1952, Mohamed Neguib and a few battalions of troops marched on Cairo, obtained the
abdication of Farouk, and arranged for a new government.25 The effects of these events
caused Eden to decide on a new settlement with the Egyptians. Eventually, Neguib
became the Prime Minister and leader of Egypt, representing the Free Officers’
Movement. While Neguib held power, Lieutenant Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser was the
acknowledged leader of the movement and would become the leader of Egypt within nine
months.26 The Egyptian Revolution had eliminated any claim to Sudan and allowed for
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the new negotiations to be solely concerned with the canal.27 Essentially, Britain could
withdraw from the canal and still have bases in the region to defend it.
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden decided to pursue a new settlement focused on
phased withdrawal, maintenance of the base for British use in times of trouble, air
defense cooperation, Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization, and
Anglo-American assistance.28 Though a Conservative, Eden was conscious that the
empire was in the words of his secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh “overstretched world wide
despite the winding up of the Indian Empire and he was concerned to reduce our
commitments to what our capacity could bear.”29 He believed three options existed:
remain in the Canal Zone, liquidation of the British position, and treaty revision. Though
the third option would ultimately entail liquidation, Eden was concerned that an
instantaneous withdrawal hampered the British position in the region and damaged
British authority.30 The situation in the Middle East had changed with Greece and Turkey
entering NATO and a proposed Middle Eastern defense organization made the British
more willing to negotiate with the Egyptians. Also, the advent of atomic weapons
nullified the strategic importance of the Canal base since atomic weapons could easily
eliminate large masses of troops and bases. The 1936 Treaty was no longer applicable
since it was signed during a time of duress. The treaty was signed when Egypt was
27
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threatened by foreign aggression and needed the British to protect Egypt from invasion.
The Egyptians now had a large enough army and were free from any threats requiring
British assistance. The canal was no longer threatened, the Palestine situation had turned
Arab opinion against the British, and internal strife existed within Egypt.31 By vacating
the canal, the British could redeem their image in the Arab world and maintain some
influence. In 1954, a British delegation under Anthony Head concluded an agreement
with the Egyptian Government providing for a two year withdrawal of British troops
from the canal and the mutual respect for the 1888 Convention.32 The treaty was a matter
of convenience for both governments since neither wanted to continue the current state of
affairs.33 The one weakness of the planned withdrawal was the state of belligerency
between Egypt and Israel, which flared over the next two years. Without the British
garrison acting as an impediment, there was a distinct possibility of the canal becoming a
battlefield in a war between Israel and Egypt. The main reason for Britain’s withdrawal
was financial since the British were still mired in post-war economic difficulties and the
cost of supporting the Suez Base proved a heavy economic burden.34
The treaty had several noteworthy provisions. The most important was the
withdrawal of British troops by 1956.35 It also provided for the maintenance of the base
and the British use of the base in the event of an external attack on Turkey or the Arab
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League.36 Article VIII provided for the upholding of the 1888 Agreement and once again
reaffirmed the strategic importance of the canal.37 The treaty devolved into a test run of
Egyptian maintenance of the canal. Most importantly, the treaty allowed the British to
use the base in times of trouble and the respect for the 1888 Convention allowed for the
free transit of the canal and the continuous flow of oil, which was vital to the economies
of Western Europe. Britain also had bases outside of Egypt in Aden, Cyprus, Malta, and
Iraq, which allowed for the defense of the canal. The British envisioned the Baghdad Pact
as a way to maintain the British presence in the region. Finally, the Canal Company still
controlled the canal and thus the canal was still European. Churchill was not pleased with
the development uttering “we have thrown our glorious empire away,” he continued in
office to save Eden from discrediting himself over Egypt.38 Churchill feared the canal
handover would ruin Eden’s political career and make Eden’s candidacy as Prime
Minister doomed to failure. Eden was pleased. He succeeded in maintaining the flow of
oil, without which the British could not live and would be strangled to death.39 By the end
of 1954, the situation in the Middle East appeared resolved and the threat of attacks on
Britain minimal. The ascension of Eden to Prime Minister followed and Eden hoped to
emerge from the shadows of Churchill to take the position he had long sought.
Unfortunately, the Middle East troubles flared up during the Eden Ministry with Nasser
and the Soviets attempting to rid the region of the British.
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Many events in the Middle East came to a head and resulted in the Suez Crisis in
1956. At the time, Anthony Eden’s health deteriorated. In 1953 three operations had
weakened him physically and Eden suffered from reoccurring jaundice. After thirty years
of struggling with dictators, his mental abilities sagged.40 The diminished state of the
Prime Minister figured into the rash decision making in the lead up to the Suez Crisis.
Three main events laid the groundwork for the Suez Crisis: the Czech arms deal of 1955,
the dismissal of Glubb of 1955, and the Aswan Dam proposal of 1956. In 1956, Eden
held a summit with First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Nikita
Khrushchev and Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin in London. During the course of the
meeting, Eden told the Soviet statesmen that “the uninterrupted supply of oil was literally
vital to our economy … and that we could not live without oil and we had no intention of
being strangled to death.”41 This statement provided Eden’s logic for British actions
during the Suez crisis. Eden’s Under Secretary in the Foreign Office Evelyn Shuckburgh
described the British position in the Middle East in the early 1950s as follows:
We were the dominant power throughout the area. We had a huge military
base on the Suez Canal, a naval base at Aden, air squadrons stationed in
Iraq, rear bases in Cyprus and Malta; we paid for and provided the
commander of the Arab Legion in Jordan. We had protectorates over
Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms, whose foreign relations we conducted through a
political resident in Bahrain. We had enormous oil investments in Iran and
a growing interest in Gulf oil. All were under attack in one way or
another.42

40

Terence Robertson, Crisis: the Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1965), 13.
Eden, 358.
42
Shuckburgh, 211.
41

108

Shuckburgh was correct in his assertion and the British dominance of the Middle East
was soon under siege. The forces of pan Arabism and Nasser targeted the British
presence in the Middle East and called for the expulsion of Britain from the region.
Conflict against British control in Cyprus, pro Nasser propaganda in Jordan, and the
Abadan crisis in Iran had lessened the British stature in the region. In 1951, Muhammad
Mussadeq, the Nationalist Prime Minister of Iran, nationalized the Anglo-Persian oil
Company and the Abadan Oilfields.43 The British eventually negotiated a settlement with
the Iranians rather than invading, thus showing an unwillingness to act with a strong
hand.44
At the beginning of the Eden Ministry, the British position in the Middle East was
relatively intact. Though the 1954 Agreement had called for the evacuation of British
troops from the Canal Zone, the troops stayed in place for another year. Also, the British
alliances with Iraq and Jordan appeared solid. But the intrusion of the Soviets into the
region shattered this illusion. Additionally, the emergence of Nasser proved a great
trouble to the Eden Ministry. Nasser was among the officers involved in the Revolution
of 1952 and was widely acknowledged as the driving force behind the movement.45 He
was involved in underground activity since his days as a student and had distinguished
himself in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.46 Nasser became President, Prime Minister, and
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Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council on February 24,195447 Nasser was in
power during the 1954 Agreement and worked to remove the British from Egypt.
However, Nasser’s goal was leadership of the Arab world and the British sponsored
Baghdad Pact proved a competitor and a challenge to Nasser.48 The trouble began on
September 27, 1955 when Nasser announced an agreement to purchase arms from the
Soviet Bloc through Czechoslovakia.49 Nasser reasoned that the 1950 Tripartite
Declaration of Britain, France, and the United States, which prohibited any arms deal
which would tip the military balance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, prevented access to prior
sources of arms. Nasser found a ready supplier in the Soviet Union. This development
led to the Soviets gaining a foothold in the most strategically important area of the
Middle East in British eyes and an alliance with the most charismatic of Arab Leaders:
Nasser. To combat and prevent the Soviet intrusion into the Middle East, the British
attempted to build a security alliance covering the Middle East, the resulting alliance was
known as the Baghdad Pact.50 The pact was built on the Turco-Iraqi alliance and grew to
also include Britain, Iran, and Pakistan, forming a defensive shield against communism
stretching from the Mediterranean to the Himalayas.51The arms deal also rendered Egypt
ineligible for the Baghdad Pact due to their perceived alliance with the Soviets and
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Nasser’s verbal attack on Nuri Said of Iraq and Glubb Pasha of Jordan.52 The attacks
came about the same time as the visit of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir John
Templar to Jordan to aid in the renewed negotiations over the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of
Alliance. The dispatch of such a high ranking official to Jordan demonstrated the
weakness of the British position. Templar had been sent to convince King Hussein of
Jordan to place his country in the Baghdad Pact; his negotiations ultimately failed.53
Previously a simple word from the British ambassador in Amman or the Commander of
the Arab Legion Glubb Pasha resulted in Jordan following British advice; but the highest
ranking military official in Britain held no sway over a minor Arab monarch. While
these events were disheartening to Eden, especially when coupled with the Czech arms
deal, further events in Jordan would diminish the British standing in the Middle East and
generate Eden’s fervent hatred of Nasser.
Beginning in 1952, Egyptian promoted Free Officer pamphlets espousing panArabism and anti-British messages began to appear in Jordan.54 In these pamphlets, their
authors labeled Britain as the enemy and exploiter of the Arabs.55 Pan Arabism was the
idea of a united Arab front against imperialism and the union of the Arab States. Nasser
was the main proponent of pan Arabism and his allegiance to this doctrine endangered
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the British position in the Middle East.56 Nasser took steps to unify with other Arab states
and assume the mantle of Arab leadership, to do this he had to oppose the British and
Israelis. By targeting the British presence in the Middle East, Nasser was able to portray
himself as the defender of the Arab States and his position tended to rely on his
opposition to Britain. The appearance of the pamphlets and the growing popularity of
Nasser targeted Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion, a symbol of British influence
in the region, and one of the most powerful men in Jordan. On March 1 1956, the Prime
Minister of Jordan summoned the British ambassador to the Palace to inform him of the
King Hussein’s s decision to dismiss Glubb.57 The rationale provided by the king was the
constant references in the press to Glubb being the true power in Jordan and Eden
believed the young monarch was jealous of Glubb.58 The aftermath witnessed the king
and Nasser being cheered in the same breath. Additionally, the meeting between Nasser
and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd did little to alleviate suspicion. According to
Mohammad Heikal, a Cairo editor and confidant of Nasser, when Lloyd and Nasser met
and discussed the dismissal, Nasser was quite happy thinking the British had seen the
anachronistic quality of Glubb’s role and removed him.59 Lloyd visited Egypt on his tour
of the Middle East and India. Lloyd and Eden took the response to mean Nasser had a
hand in the dismissal of Glubb. Eden was angry enough to consider reneging on the 1954
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treaty’s evacuation clause as way of countering the loss of Glubb.60 Eden compared
Nasser to Mussolini earlier in the year and his hatred of the upstart Egyptian leader
continued to grow.61 He blamed Nasser for all attacks on British interests in the Middle
East and determined to alleviate the threat.62 In the following months, Eden informed
visiting Soviet dignitaries of the British need of oil warning them that Britain would fight
to protect her oil supply. By April 1956, a struggle between Eden and Nasser for
dominance of the Middle East was brewing and Nasser’s next move brought events to
war footing. Nasser gained a free hand due to the removal of British forces from Egypt
on June 13 1956 at 6:45 A.M.63 On that day the Union Jack was hauled down from the
Navy House at Port Said and seventy years of occupation ended.64 Nasser was free to act
without threat of immediate British retaliation despite his comments to Minister at Large
Selwyn Lloyd stating, “we cannot understand why you are worrying about these matters
now. We will be friends with when the attack comes. We will make a pact then.”65 No
pact was made.
At a cost of thirteen hundred million dollars, a fee the Egyptians could not meet,
the Egyptian Government proposed the Aswan High Dam in 1955 to improve Nile Valley
irrigation and develop hydroelectricity.66 The Egyptians appealed to the World Bank for
60
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funding and Nasser seized upon the construction of the dam as a national goal.67 The
British were concerned by Nasser’s course of action if the project was not funded and
feared that it might result in the possible seizure of the canal and disruption of European
economic life.68 The main power behind the World Bank was the United States and the
proposal was not popular in Congress. The publicity associated with the dam
construction threatened to lead to exorbitant requests from other Arab countries. Eden
commented on the effect of the dam on the Arab world by saying,
if there was to be charity, then friendly Arab countries had the right to
apply. They could hardly be expected to view with enthusiasm the
advance of large sums for an Egyptian project while the country was
becoming ever more closely linked with Soviet Russia and while Egyptian
propaganda was attacking both them and us.69

Essentially, giving aid to Nasser suggested rewarding his overtures to the Soviets.
Suspicions of Nasser and his ties to the Soviet Union led the Americans to pull out of the
World Bank negotiations. Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein’s statement that if the
United States would not fund the dam, then the Soviets would, proved the impetus for the
withdrawal.70 United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed Hussein’s
statement to be a threat of blackmail and broke off the negotiations.71 With the option of
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World Bank funding revoked, Nasser turned to the only other funding opportunity
available: the canal itself. On 26 July 1956, Nasser spoke in Alexandria and said,
We shall never repeat the past, but we shall eliminate the past by
reclaiming our rights to the Suez Canal. This money is ours and this canal
belongs to Egypt because it is an Egyptian limited liability company. We
shall build the High Dam and we shall obtain our usurped right. We shall
build the High Dam as we desire we are determined. Thirty five million
pounds annually is taken by the Canal Company. Therefore I have signed
today and the government has approved the following: a resolution
adopted by the president of the republic for the nationalization of the Suez
Canal. 72
With this action, Nasser confirmed the worst fears and suspicions of the British
Government. The British had fought for the canal several times before to protect the
route to India, now the issue was whether or not Britain would fight for their oil supply
and influence in the Middle East.
The Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal panicked and infuriated the British
Government, particularly Anthony Eden. As historian John Darwin noted,
the vital strategic waterway whose security had preoccupied British
strategy since the 1870s passed under the direct physical control of a local
power fiercely hostile to British influence. Full measure of British
weakness became clear.73
Eden also saw an opportunity to deal with the upstart leader of Egypt and to end his
challenge to British power. Upon hearing the news, Eden was furious and remarked “our
whole position demands strong action. I want to seize the canal and take charge of it
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again.”74 When informed that Nasser’s action was legal, Eden showed his true hatred of
Nasser by saying, “I don’t care whether it’s legal or not, I ‘m not going to let him do it ...
he’s not going to get away with it.”75 Though the canal was no longer under British
protection and the nationalization was a perfectly legal maneuver, the perceived value of
the canal precipitated a militant British reaction.
The British viewed the canal as vital to their well being due to its role in oil
supply and regional influence. Eden identified three main concerns over the canal
seizure. The first concern was that the “canal was an international asset and had been
recognized as such ever since the Convention of 1888.”76 Chancellor of the Exchequer
Harold Macmillan believed that “such a flagrant breach of international convention
would lead to a decline in international good faith reminiscent of world wars.”77 The
development of Middle Eastern oil and the Western European reliance on the canal for oil
transport provided another reason for the necessity of the canal to the empire. Finally,
Eden believed the canal formed the centerpiece of British influence in the region. He
remarked “failure to keep the canal international would inevitably lead to the loss one by
one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty’s
Government had to act alone they could not stop short of using force to protect their
position.”78 Eden viewed Nasser as the enemy of Western influence in the Middle East
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and following in the footsteps of Hitler.79 The British had missed an opportunity to check
the fascists before World War II and the acquiescence at Munich weighed heavy in their
minds. This time they took no chances and on July 27 the Prime Minister instructed the
Chiefs of Staff to prepare an invasion plan.80 The British would not sit back and watch
their influence assaulted.
The British attempted to evict Nasser from the canal through diplomacy. On July
28, the British Government summoned a conference of maritime powers and froze
Egyptian assets.81 The United States, Great Britain, and France participated at the
conference. During the meeting Eden proposed direct action against Nasser and Robert
Murphy of the United States State Department remarked, “it seemed impossible for Eden
to keep in mind how much Britain’s power had diminished in relation to the United
States and Russia.”82 While the Americans viewed the crisis as an international matter
and favored a diplomatic solution, the French sided with Britain and favored direct
action. The French Government believed Nasser was supplying Algerian nationalists in
their struggle with France. As a result France supplied weapons to the Israelis in hope of
toppling Nasser.83 In deference to the Americans, Eden and the British Government
agreed to convene a conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention. The First
London Conference was the beginning of several failed diplomatic initiatives to end the
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crisis before hostilities commenced. Prior to the conference, Eden broadcast to the
British people, “we cannot agree that an act of plunder which threatens the livelihood of
many nations shall be allowed to succeed.”84
While in public the British favored a political solution, the Chiefs of Staff
formulated four methods of invading Egypt on August 3 with Alexandria and Port Said
both targets. 85 The London Conference began on August 16, 1956. The end result of the
conference was a declaration for an international board including Egypt to oversee the
canal and to maintain the canal as apolitical. A delegation headed by the Prime Minister
of Australia Robert Menzies carried the conference resolution to Nasser.86As the Menzies
mission disembarked, the British Government pondered other diplomatic solutions and
the prospect of military action. The Foreign Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands,
Paul Henri Spaak and Joseph Luns, argued for the NATO powers to refuse recognition of
the canal seizure and Spaak believed if “the Western powers quailed, he foresaw a long
series of retreats before them in Africa and the Middle East.”87 Eden agreed with this
view and had received reports from East Africa and Aden foreshadowing unrest in the
Muslim world.88 The Menzies mission was in Egypt from September 2-9 and Nasser
rejected the London Conference proposal for the Suez Canal, dismissing it as collective
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colonialism, and refused the overture due to infringements on Egyptian sovereignty.89
Nasser and Menzies took an instantaneous dislike of one another and this poor
relationship hampered negotiations.90 In a conversation with Menzies, Nasser stated
What is your problem? ... Freedom of Navigation? I’m ready to discuss
that. Tolls ? I’m ready to discuss that. The British press charges that I’m
trying to build an empire? We can discuss that too if you want-but I will
not discuss Egyptian sovereignty. Perhaps you would like to discuss
British fears that I am going to cut off the lifeline of their empire? If I did
that, it would mean war with Britain. Do you think I’m crazy enough to do
that? And if I was so crazy how could the international board that you
propose prevent me from doing that in any case. 91

The failure of the Menzies mission served to exacerbate the situation between Britain and
Egypt. Nasser did not appear open to diplomacy and was firmly aware of the accusations
against him. Additionally, he was resolute in his unwillingness to permit any
international authority over the canal or to give Britain an impetus for military action.
Eden’s use of diplomacy to resolve the crisis was failing.
During late August and September 1956, Eden not only had to balance the
situation with Nasser, but also domestic opinion on the canal seizure and the Atlantic
Alliance. The British Government believed that “every day Nasser was strengthening his
hold on the canal. The Western powers would lose face unless they could react clearly
and speedily to his rejection of the eighteen power proposals.”92 The problem was with
Nasser backed by the Soviets, the British needed the Americans on their side and it was
89
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difficult to make out where the Americans stood.93 Additionally, it was an election year
and the American diplomats were under instructions to oppose intervention, so as not to
hinder Eisenhower’s reelection chances.94 The Americans also espoused an anti-colonial
rhetoric and the possible embarrassment of association with a perceived imperial
intervention threatened their standing in the struggle with the Soviets. By the time
Nasser rejected the London Conference proposals carried by the Menzies mission, the
Americans had proposed another diplomatic solution: the User’s Club. While the
Americans were avoiding any intervention, the British public took a different view.
The British Public and the Suez Group forced Eden to gravitate between two
different solutions to the Suez Crisis. In a British Institute of Public Opinion poll on
Military Action in Egypt taken from August 16-24, 1956, thirty-three percent of British
citizens advocated military action against Nasser.95 A September 5-6, 1956 poll on the
issue of an ultimatum with possible invasion, thirty four percent of those surveyed
advocated the ultimatum and forty-seven percent of Conservatives surveyed.96 The polls
indicated a lack of decision on the part of the British public, which favored economic and
political sanctions. While the public was not ready for war, a group within Eden’s own
party was. The Suez Group was a group of Conservative back benchers still bitter over
Britain’s imperial retreat and who “thought that Britain would amount to very little in the
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world if it could not exert effective leadership of a larger unit.”97 The Suez Group
believed British dominance of the Middle East was the main claim Britain could make to
world power status. Without this dominance, the British world position would lessen. The
group also believed the Indian withdrawal to have been predicated on the continued
British presence in Egypt and did not favor further British withdrawals in the Middle
East.98 The Suez Group wanted action against Nasser as a way to avoid another British
imperial retreat. When the crisis began the Suez Group jumped at the opportunity to
weaken Nasser and to reassert the British dominance in the Middle East. As the crisis
dragged on, it became more and more apparent that Eden would have to choose between
direct action or giving in to Nasser.
As Egyptian control of the canal entered its second month in September 1956, the
British struggled with American insistence on a diplomatic solution. United States
Secretary of State John Dulles proposed the formation of a Suez Canal User’s Club
(SCUA) to work to implement the 1888 Convention, cooperate with Egypt, and prevent
canal traffic from coming under political influence.99 A conference of the proposed
SCUA was called in September 1956 in London. The House of Commons met on
September 12 to discuss the Middle East and the Labour party asked Eden to refer the
issue to the Security Council or the International Court of Justice.100 The reason for the
hostile nature of Labour’s attack were comments by both Dulles and President
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Eisenhower stating they did not wish to see Britain shoot their way through the canal. 101
The Americans forced the British to agree to the SCUA proposal to preclude the use of
force, though the only measures of enforcement the club had were asset freezing and rerouting. The existence of enforcement measures provided the difference between the
London Conference proposals and the SCUA. The possibility of re-routing allowed
Nasser to get away with his theft and would hinder the oil supplies of Western Europe:
Nasser would win.102 Nasser termed the SCUA an association for waging war and
accused the eighteen powers of the First London Conference of “international thuggery
and imperialism.”103 Nasser objected to the SCUA due to his belief that the canal was an
Egyptian possession and should not be subject to international control. The dispute
shaped up to be one of imperialism versus nationalism with Britain as aggressor. Worst
of all for Eden, the Egyptians proved effective at running the canal. While the SCUA
was scuttled by Nasser’s refusal, the issue went to the United Nations.
On September 26, 1956, Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris and conferred with their
French counterparts. The French had shown themselves to be Britain’s staunchest ally in
the canal dispute. Eden assured the French that British Government had not abandoned
their objective of removing the canal from the control of a single government, preserving
efficient navigation, and to prevent the Middle East from coming under Soviet
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domination.104 The two governments agreed to coordinate their position in the upcoming
Security Council debate. Eden also added that the Egyptian attack on treaties had
endangered international confidence.105 On October 1, the inaugural meeting of the
SCUA occurred in London and the discussion of the canal nationalization began at the
United Nations Security Council. A British sponsored resolution was debated on October
13 and entailed six principles on which settlement must abide,
1. There should be free and open transit through the canal without
discrimination, covert or overt.
2. The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected
3. The operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any
country.
4. The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users.
5. A fair proportion of the due should be allotted to development
6. In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal
Company and Egyptian Government should be settled by
arbitration.106
The Security Council adopted these six principles unanimously, but the second part of the
resolution proved difficult.107 The operative portion called for the governments of Britain,
France, and Egypt to continue their interchange, free passage to all shipping, the payment
of SCUA member dues to the SCUA, and Egyptian cooperation in canal management.108
The Soviet Union vetoed the second part of the resolution. The British wanted a
settlement to preserve the international character of the canal and had tried several
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diplomatic solutions. Nothing had worked and Nasser still controlled the canal. Another
option had to be pursued.
By the middle of October 1956, diplomacy had failed the British government.
Nasser rebuffed the First London Conference and the Menzies Mission, he viewed the
proposals as an infringement upon Egyptian sovereignty. The SCUA lacked any power
of enforcement and would hurt Western Europe more than Egypt, but it too was
dismissed by Nasser as international thuggery. The United Nations Security Council
agreed upon the six principles of settlement for the crisis, but the resolution was vetoed
by the Soviets. The Suez Group lobbied Eden to act with authority in the Middle East
and the French were willing to support the British. The British public, though not
favoring immediate military action, desired a settlement of some form. Finally, Nasser’s
reputation and celebrity in the Arab world grew with each day he defied the British. In
his September response to the Menzies mission, Nasser had stated he would not enter into
hostilities with the British. Were the British to attack Egypt, the move would be
perceived as imperialistic throughout the world and would risk losing American support.
Eden had exhausted all diplomatic options and military action was becoming the best
solution.
The British still publicly claimed to respect international agreements and the
desire to preserve free navigation of the canal as their goal. As long as Nasser effectively
ran the canal, little chance existed of these goals allowing military action. Events in the
Middle East brought matters to a head. The Israeli raid on Gaza in 1955 had heightened
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border tensions between Israel and Egypt.109 Nasser’s flow of arms from the Eastern Bloc
and the subsequent arms flow to Syria pointed to a coming Arab-Israeli war. Egypt also
attempted to enlist Jordan, with whom the British had a defense treaty, into an alliance
and pro-Nasser elements had emerged victorious in the Jordanian elections of 1956.110
On October 10, 1956, Israeli troops entered the Jordanian village of Qalqiya, killing forty
eight Jordanians before they withdrew upon the arrival of the Arab Legion.111 The raid
was in response to Palestinian raids into Israeli territory. Not only did Israel benefit from
a superior army, but since 1955 they had been receiving a steady supply of French
armaments and equipment.112 The situation in the Middle East was dangerous. The
Israelis had taken military action against both Egypt and Jordan within two years. In the
event of an Israeli attack on Jordan, Britain was treaty bound to honor her alliance with
Jordan. If Israel attacked Egypt, the safety of the canal would be jeopardized. No matter
which course the Israeli Government took, Britain would be involved.
In late October 1956, two momentous events in Cold War history occurred. On
October 23, 1956 the first reports of the disturbances in Hungary appeared and on
October 25, the British Government received a report that the Israeli army was
mobilizing.113 On October 29, the Israeli army moved into the Sinai Peninsula and
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attacked Egyptian positions.114 The beginning of the Israeli attack on Egypt yielded a
great historic debate over the collusion between the British, French, and Israel and the socalled Sevres Protocol. Historian Terrence Robertson was one of the first to assert this
theory and believed that the Israeli attack was orchestrated to allow the Anglo-French
invasion.115 Historian Donald Neff subscribed to this view and accepted the collusion as
accepted fact in his work, allowing for a greater portrayal the Suez Crisis as a colonial
action.116 Selwyn Lloyd vehemently denied any collusion and though Eden believed the
Israelis to have cause for the attack, made no mention of the Sevres Protocol.117Recent
scholarship has confirmed the collusion and no source more vividly illustrates the extent
of the plotting as Edward Heath’s The Course of My Life: My Autobiography.118 The
course of the collusion is at times convoluted, but when looked at as a whole describes
the last great peak in the British attachment to the Suez Canal.
The beginning of the collusion occurred on September 10, 1956 with the arrival of
French Premier Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau in London for crisis
talks.119 The French favored direct airborne action against Nasser and Eden agreed since
an attack on Cairo would not be received well in the world political climate.120 The
Americans were vehemently against military action and realized that an increase in oil
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exports from the United States, Venezuela, and Canada coupled with redirection of
tankers round the Cape Route would sustain European oil: the strangulation argument
was debunked.121 In addition, Eisenhower was not prepared to commit the United States
to military action over the canal. The British and French tried to force the issue of
military action by having the Suez Canal Company order its pilots off the job on
September 14, but the Egyptians proved more than capable of running the canal122 On
September 12, 1956, Eden announced in Commons that Britain would take action if
Egypt ignored her obligations under the 1888 Convention.123 The problem was the
Americans did not back the British and John Foster Dulles denied American support for
any British plan to “shoot their way through the canal.124 Dulles’ statement effectively
gave Nasser the victory since without American support and unprovoked European
assault appeared impossible. Meetings in Paris proved Nasser wrong.
On September 23, 1956 Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was in Paris for
talks and Pineau flew to London to raise the possibility of collusion with the Israelis. If
Israel attacked Egypt, the British and French could go in as peacekeepers. Eden was quite
intrigued by the proposition, but Selwyn Lloyd was apathetic, more concerned about the
effect on Britain’s Middle East position.125 On September 20, Eden and Lloyd flew to
Paris to allegedly discuss the European Free Trade Area, but went to plan the assault. In
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order to cover their tracks, Britain announced that Her Majesty’s Government would
honor her treaty obligations with Jordan, if Jordan were attacked by Israel.126 Britain
appeared to be anti-Israeli and the possibility of war in the Middle East pointed to an
Israeli-Jordanian affair. On October 23, 1956, the Sevres Protocol was signed calling for
Israeli to attack Egypt and the French to veto any anti-Israeli resolutions in the United
Nations.127 Eden consented to this agreement and the planned ultimatum and invasion
appeared set in stone. Eden was determined that Nasser and his regime must be brought
down.128 Upon the signing of the agreement, Eden gathered Lloyd, Macmillan, and Chief
Whip Edward Heath together and stated “we’ve got an agreement Israel had agreed to
invade Egypt. We shall then send in our forces backed up by the French, to separate the
combatants and regain the canal.”129 Such was the resolve of Eden to defend the canal
that he conspired to regain control through subterfuge.
Upon receiving the news of Israeli mobilization, the British Cabinet decided that
in the event of hostilities, Israel would defeat Egypt. The issue was how to protect the
canal. The Cabinet decided that in such an event, France and Britain would call upon
both parties to cease hostilities, withdraw a certain distance from the canal, and intervene
if one side refused compliance.130 By October 30, the Israelis were halfway to the canal
and the possibility of the canal becoming a battle ground existed, in violation of Article

126

Ibid., 146.
Ibid., 166.
128
Heath, 169.
129
Ibid.
130
Eden, 523.
127

128

IV of the 1888 Constantinople Agreement. A possibility also existed of Jordan and Syria
joining the war and Eden decided that the arrival of British troops would prompt these
two countries to inaction. With the United Nations and several diplomatic conferences
having failed, the ultimatum was the best course of action. On October 30 1956, the
British Cabinet met and decided to issue the ultimatum and Eden announced the decision
to the House of Commons at 4:30 P.M, by saying “that the French and British
Governments were agreed that everything should be done to bring hostilities to an
end.”131 The ultimatum called for a cessation of hostilities and the two sides to withdraw
ten miles from the canal. He further announced that the purpose was to separate the
belligerents and guarantee the free navigation of the canal.132 He described the possible
occupation of the canal area by British and French troops as temporary and Eden
announced a Security Council meeting would be sought immediately. On the evening of
October 30, the Security Council met and the United States proposed a resolution calling
for an immediate end to hostilities, an Israeli withdrawal, and urging all members to
restrain from force.133 The proposed resolution took away the British ultimatum and
proposed nothing in its place; this proposal resulted in the first British use of her veto
power on the council. A subsequent Soviet resolution was vetoed by Britain and France,
the ultimatum had been issued and the British were not going to let the American and
Soviet resolutions counteract it. The veto was in keeping with the Sevres Protocol. The

131

Ibid., 527.
Ibid.
133
Ibid., 529.
132

129

Egyptians rejected the ultimatum and on October 31, the British agreed to commence air
attacks on the Egyptian air force.134 On November 1 at 10:29 P.M., Selwyn Lloyd
announced the commencement of hostilities in the House of Commons.135
The British prepared for an invasion from the outset of the crisis and forces had
been standing ready since mid-September. The plan called for four phases. The first
phase consisted of the elimination of the Egyptian air force followed by the second phase,
air attacks on Egyptian military installations. The third phase was an airborne landing in
the canal zone followed by a seaborne landing at the opening of the canal. While a lack of
landing craft hampered the invasion plan, it was incalculable that Egypt would stand up
to the combined force of Britain and France. The attacks had an opposite effect. Allied
air attacks stiffened Egyptian resolve and morale, Nasser broke diplomatic relations with
Britain and France, ordered all British and French citizens to register with authorities
within three days, and most importantly ordered the blockage of the canal.136 The very
reason for British intervention was at risk and Nasser was not backing down. On
November 1, Radio Cairo announced the sinking of fifty ships thereby blocking the
canal. 137 On November 3, 1956 Egypt’s ally Syria broke diplomatic relations with
Britain and France and blew up the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline crossing Syria.138
The objectives of Eden’s Government were defunct. The oil supply to Europe was
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blocked by the ships in the canal and the pipeline sabotaged. The preservation of free
navigation through the canal was impossible. The British influence in the Middle East
dwindled due to her perceived alliance with Israel and Nasser’s growing popularity
stemming from his defiance of Britain. The battle continued in the field and in the
political sphere.
While events on the ground went against the British, the Labour Party and the
United Nations also assailed the British decision to use force. Near fisticuffs
characterized the Commons debate on November 1 and Eden was booed and greeted with
cries that he should resign.139 Labour Member Aneurin Bevan accused the Eden
Government of bullying Egypt and acting towards Egypt as the Nazis had towards
Norway. A motion of censure failed and Eden survived on party lines.140 On November 2
the United Nations General Assembly, operating under the Uniting for Peace Plan,
debated events in Egypt with the United States leading the diplomatic attack on Britain.
The Uniting for Peace Plan was a United Nations maneuver which allowed a debate to be
sent from the Security Council to the General Assembly, where no vetoes were
applicable. The resolution called for an immediate cease fire, a prohibition of further
military goods into the area, and an emergency session of the General Assembly until the
crisis was over. The resolution passed sixty-four to five, only Britain, France, Israel,
Australia, and New Zealand voted against the resolution.141 Eden announced to
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Commons that the British were not prepared to halt their action as long as hostilities
continued and the Anglo-French forces would hand over their position to a United
Nations police force if created.142 On November 4, the Cabinet met to discuss the
progress of the land invasion as the Canadian delegation to the United Nations drafted a
resolution for the formation of a UN police force.143 The problem was the Israelis had
already taken the Sinai by November 3 and the Egyptians had retreated from the
Peninsula. Without a United Nations force, Eden decided to proceed with the invasion
and Britain and France announced they were landing troops to assure the withdrawal of
Israeli troops from Egypt.144 David Ben-Gurion was outraged at the statement and
announced Israeli acceptance of the cease fire.145 On November 5, the airborne landing
began and on November 6, the seaborne landing occurred.146 With Israel and Egypt
having accepted the ceasefire, Eden announced to Commons, “Her Majesty’s
Government are ordering their forces to ceasefire at midnight GMT unless they are
attacked.”147 British forces were in a position to seize the canal, but Eden lost his resolve
due to British economic difficulties. French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau recalled, “
I hear a broken voice that of a man who has exhausted the limits of his own resistance
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and is ready to let himself drown. In substance he says, it is no longer possible, we must
stop, the pound has dropped again we risk panic.”148
The British involvement in the Suez War lasted five days. Casualties proved
minimal and the Government had deployed over ten thousand men to Egypt, but events
spiraled out of Eden’s control. Three main forces ended the British action: oil, the British
economy, and world opinion. The canal blockage and pipeline detonation hampered the
oil reserves of Britain and rationing had to be imposed.149 The cost of the invasion
brought economic troubles with gold and dollar reserves falling fifty seven million
dollars in September, eighty-four million in October, and three hundred nine million in
November, Britain needed dollars to purchase oil from alternative sources.150 The British
pound was dependent on the American dollar and, despite financial crises in the late
1940s, de facto convertibility of transferable sterling had been achieved.151 The British
Government strove to make the pound convertible into gold and dollars, but the position
of the pound was precarious. As early as August 1956, the British financial officials
feared attacks on the pound or curtailed oil supplies would hamper the pound.152 Both
these fears were realized. Numerous Arab countries refused to sell oil for pounds and the
British had to use dollar reserves to purchase oil.153 The pound devalued as gold and

148

Ibid., 416.
Ibid., 424.
150
Ibid.
151
Diane B. Kunz, “The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis,” in William Roger Louis and Roger
Owen, Suez 1956 The Crisis and Its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 216-219.
152
Ibid.
153
Ibid.
149

133

dollar reserves plummeted as the Bank of England tried to maintain convertibility and the
pound began to lose value.154 The only way to salvage the British economy was from
outside aid. With the devaluing of the pound, the only currency stable enough to bail out
the British was the dollar, but the Americans were not in a generous mood. The only
available source of aid was the Americans and they would not discuss economic aid until
the British troops withdrew, which they did on December 22. The Egyptian Government
also would not contemplate clearing the canal until the British withdrew from Egypt.155
The Middle East ceased to look to Britain for guidance and the Soviets and Americans
entered the region. The Soviets gained a foothold in the Middle East and soon signed
arms deals with Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Nasser gained immense popularity and became
an Arab hero. The statue of Ferdinand de Lesseps at Port Said was dynamited on
December 24 and the Egyptians removed the last vestige of European control of the
canal.156 Eden resigned as prime minister shortly after the crisis and his successor Harold
Macmillan oversaw the break up of the empire. The Iraqi Government of Nuri Said, the
most pro-British of Arab statesmen, fell in 1958 and Said and the royal family of Iraq
were murdered.157 With the assassination of Said, the last foothold of the British in the
Middle East disappeared.
The collusion had backfired and events following the cease fire acceptance and an
appraisal of the Suez Crisis are described by Edward Heath,
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Eden told his cabinet secretary on 14 December to destroy all relevant
documents and the Sevres Protocol. Despite later revelations, Eden never
changed his position. At the time he was absolutely convinced that the
prevention of a dictator getting his own way was in the interest of Britain,
the Middle East, and the world as a whole. He considered it essential to
safeguard world peace and the vital trade routes of ourselves and our
friends. The fact that we managed for so long after the canal was closed
with the alternative route around the cape, and developed carriers of larger
tonnage for that purposed proved how wrong that premise was, but it does
not alter the genuine nature of his concern. Similarly, the fact that once the
canal was opened, the Egyptians were able to run it so easily contradicted
all the previous assertions that an international consortium was essential
for operational purposes if traffic through the canal was to survive. But
that was a genuine belief at the time. Eden also claimed that introducing
international control backed by international forces into the Middle East
would limit Nasser’s power and this was a future safeguard against any
future expansionist ideas from him. The fact that later his expansionism
led him into Yemen and into treaties with Syrian and Libya rather counter
this claim.158

While Heath, believed the operation was a failure and fiasco, Lloyd and Eden took a
different view.
Eden believed the operation was a success and prevented the establishment of a
pan-Arab empire.159 He noted the Israeli access to the canal and the prevention of
Egyptian control of both sides of the canal. The latter portion is in error since the
Egyptians controlled both sides of the canal until 1967. Selwyn Lloyd provided a balance
sheet of the crisis in his memoirs. He believed that negative results from the crisis
existed: diplomatic defeat, failure to establish international control of the canal, the
failure to enhance an Arab-Israeli settlement, and the psychological blow of the defeat to
158
159
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the British people.160 Two of the three negatives identified by Lloyd for British actions in
Suez were accomplished: the prevention of a general conflagration of hostilities and the
checking of Nasser.161 Lloyd also contended the events of 1956 did not detract from
British influence in the Middle East and led to closer Anglo-American cooperation.162
The enhanced Anglo-American cooperation derived from the British realization that it
was impossible for Britain to act in opposition to the Americans. The British viewed
cooperation with the Americans as a sure way to avoid the mistakes of 1956. The end
result was the relegation of Britain from world power status. While Eden and Lloyd are
correct in the beneficial aspects of Suez, the strengthening of the Atlantic alliance and the
checking of Nasser, the events of 1956 had three main results for the British. First, the
only claim Britain had to world power was as an ally of the Americans. Secondly, British
hegemony in the Middle East was replaced by a Soviet-American struggle for hegemony
with Britain playing the role of outlier. Third, the war exposed the weakness of the
British Empire and the victory of Nasser led to similar leaders arising throughout the
world demanding independence from the British Empire. Finally, the results of the crisis
forced Anthony Eden, the heir to Churchill and the imperial symbolism associated with
that title, from office and the result was the Conservative Party oversaw the dissolution of
the British Empire. As Chester Cooper, a member of the CIA during the crisis observed,
In three bitter wars British forces had met and vanquished
formidable enemies near the Nile. Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm,
160
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Mussolini, and Hitler each tried to gain control over the Isthmus of
Suez; each suffered defeat. But the combined forces of Britain and
France met with disaster after one short week in their effort to
regain control of the Suez Canal from Nasser and his third rate
army.163
The events of Suez did not result in the immediate end of the British Empire, but
weakened British world standing and allowed the beginning of the process of
decolonization. No longer would Britain dictate politics in the Middle East and no longer
would the British control the canal. The eighty one year attachment had ended.
The Suez Crisis and the Sevres Protocol represented the last peak in the imperial
attachment to the canal. In the prior two phases, the power of the British Empire allowed
for direct action to safeguard the canal. However as British power waned, the attachment
to the canal remained unaltered. Eden used the reasons of oil supplies and the Soviet
threat as legitimizations for the actions during the Suez Crisis, but neither was valid
enough to necessitate the behavior of the British Government. Pressure from the Suez
Group, the public, and the British past mandated that the canal remain British or belong
to no other country. The canal held a hallowed place in the imperial worldview and to
forfeit possession of the canal to a former holding was analogous to forfeiting any British
claim to world power. Eden and many in his party saw the canal as the last possession of
influence Britain controlled in the changing world political scene. Such was the deep
rooted attachment to the canal that Eden risked the vitality of empire, the British
economy, and his own career to maintain British control, or at least influence, over the
163
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canal. Like Disraeli, Gladstone, and Churchill before him, Eden wanted to maintain the
imperial attachment to the canal and avoid the shame of being the Prime Minister who
lost this vital artery. Eden alienated Britain’s American and Arab allies and sounded the
beginning of the end of the British Empire. Eden risked his political career and the
empire on reclaiming the canal, unfortunately Eden lost. The importance attached to the
canal sounded the end of the empire. In the past, Britain had fought to protect the canal
and been successful in defending the canal. The canal was the lifeline of the empire, or so
it was thought. The attachment to the canal was so great and entrenched that Eden knew
he had to act and believed his actions were justified, even the collusion. Unfortunately,
Eden’s actions served to hamper the empire and show the world the waning of British
power.
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Chapter V
Conclusion

Successive British Governments from Disraeli to Eden viewed the Suez Canal as
a vital part of the British Empire. The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the Great
Revolt had demonstrated the need for the empire to control or at least dominate the
Middle East to protect the empire. The Suez Canal represented not only a great benefit to
British trade but a vital cog in imperial security. Control of the canal meant control of the
Middle East, the safety of the Indian Empire, and later the protection of oil supplies to the
empire. Britain depended on the region to maintain the vital artery between the Home
Islands and India. The canal was the scene of great British victories and the gateway to
the exotic lands of the empire. Disraeli felt he achieved a great coup by the purchase of
the canal shares in 1875 and, despite doubters at the time, he was correct. The imperial
attachment to the canal endured several shifts from 1875 to 1956, but one constant
remained: the empire needed the canal.
Beginning in 1875, the canal occupied a central role in the strategy of the British
Empire. The danger of a French controlled canal astride the route to India was too grave a
danger for imperial strategists to allow. The British established themselves as the prime
beneficiary of the canal in the early 1870s and gained a say in the running of the Suez
Canal Company. Despite an initial fear of entanglement in Egypt, the British used the
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canal for economic benefit in the early 1870s. Khedive Ismail’s attempts at
Westernization and the negative effects of these projects on Egypt’s finance, plus worries
of European financial ties with Egypt forced the British to take a direct role in the
government of Egypt through the 1877 Dual Control. The subsequent Arabi Revolt in
1882 and British occupation served to demonstrate the importance the British attached to
the canal. The threat of anarchy and lawlessness in the canal area prompted the
Gladstone Government to take action. While explained as an invasion to restore order,
Gladstone admitted to Lord Ripon that “apart from the canal we have no interest in
Egypt.”1 A temporary occupation began and lasted until 1956. The first phase of the
imperial attachment to the canal saw the British position along the canal threatened by
several European powers and identified as the achilles’ heel of the empire. Nonetheless,
controlling the canal or preventing others from controlling the canal became a bulwark of
British imperial defense policy.
The period from 1914 to 1945 was characterized by British vacillation over the
importance of the canal. The British garrisoned and defended the canal in World War I.
The canal was the scene and starting point of the only purely British victories of World
War I and it was intimately associated with the actions of Allenby and Lawrence of
Arabia. The British territorial acquisitions after World War I created a new area of
imperial rule with the canal as the centerpiece. Such was the British attachment to the
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canal that the British Government insisted that British dominance over the canal be
written into the peace treaties after World War I. The importance of the canal grew with
the pending independence of Egypt and the British Government refused to hand over the
canal to the Egyptians, citing the issue of the canal as one of the four points of reservation
for Egyptian independence. The interwar period saw a temporary retreat from the
traditional view of the canal. The base at Singapore and the prospect of war with Japan
rendered the canal expendable and allowed Egyptian defense to become dilapidated.
Only when Italy threatened the British dominance of the canal was the Mediterranean
once again termed the first battlefield of Britain. The canal occupied a central role in the
North African Campaign with the Axis forces attempting to seize the canal and British
forces preventing the loss of the canal. The victories of Montgomery and the Eighth
Army were tied to the canal. Without the canal, no British troops would have been in the
region. In both World Wars, the canal was used to transport imperial troops to defend the
empire and was the scene of the forces of the empire rallying to defeat the enemies of the
crown.
The last phase of imperial attachment stretched from 1945 to 1956. Similar to the
second phase, the canal went through a period of de-emphasis. The Atlee Government
wanted to hand over the canal and believed that there was little use for the British base at
the Canal Zone. The development of nuclear weapons and the weakness of Britain in
comparison with the Soviets and Americans necessitated the empire cutting its losses.
The failure of the Sidqi-Bevin talks and the loss of Palestine, though, re-emphasized the
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importance of the canal. The British Empire might have lost India, but new importance
was found for the canal. The canal was the most important strategic holding in the
Middle East, the one part of the globe where Britain was paramount. It also represented a
base from which the British could meet Soviet advances and play an active role in the
Cold War. Finally, the oil shipped through the canal represented the existence and
survival of Western Europe. The Suez Crisis of 1956 demonstrated the lingering
attachment to the canal and the continued British reluctance to accept anything other than
British control of the canal. When Nasser nationalized the canal, the British Government
began planning an invasion despite its weakened power. The Eden Government even
went as far as to engage in collusion to protect the canal. The end of the Suez Crisis and
the blocking of the canal formed the last gasps of the imperial attachment, after which the
British ceased to play a role in canal operations and, to a huge extent, ceased to be a
world power.
This thesis proposed to show the continued imperial attachment to the canal.
Some historians view the history of British-Suez Canal policy as a scattering of events
dictated by larger world events. This view is simply not the case. The British Government
and British Foreign Policy linked themselves to the security of the Suez Canal. In the first
phase of attachment, the canal was viewed as necessary to protect the Indian Empire and
guarantee British trade, both sources of British world power. British power became
linked to the canal from 1875 to 1914 and the canal guaranteed imperial trade and
security. The second phase from, 1914 to 1945 showcased the importance and continued
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presence of the canal in British Imperial Strategy and policy. Both World Wars saw the
British devote thousands of troops to the protection of the canal. The British risked their
world status and even the empire on one last attempt to protect the canal in the third
phase of its history. Essentially, the imperial attachment to the canal proved to be more
than a series of isolated events. Instead, the imperial attachment to the canal began with
the opening of the canal and the realization of the strategic and economic importance of
the canal for the vitality of the empire. When the initial reason of Indian security ended
in 1947, the British Government found new reasons of oil and influence. The canal
formed a source of strength and power for the empire and it is not coincidental that the
end of the imperial attachment came at the same time as the wane of the empire. The
multitude of shifts relating to the canal represented the changing role of Britain in the
world. While the canal did not hold the empire together by itself, it certainly aided in the
success of the empire. No matter what importance the canal held at a certain time, one
statement proved accurate: the canal occupied a vital role in imperial strategy and policy
from 1875 to 1956 and that strategy intertwined itself with the maintenance of the power
and prestige of the British Empire.
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